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I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination laws serve an important societal function.
The laws serve to debunk myths by making it illegal for
employers to act on unjustified stereotypes of employees based on
certain protected traits. Unfortunately, the employment
discrimination field continues to be dominated by a myth of
another kind-the idea that the standard enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green1 is a monolithic framework
that should identically apply to both state and federal
discrimination claims.
Although realizing that prongs of the test may change
depending on the type of claim before the court, both courts and
litigants often assume that once a particular claim is identified,
the prongs of McDonnell Douglas are fairly stable.2 This
assumption leads to a somewhat formulaic result: The federal
courts apply the same McDonnell Douglas test to claims brought
not only under federal antidiscrimination statutes but also to
claims brought pursuant to often similar, but not identical, state
antidiscrimination laws.3
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2. Id. at 802 (holding that if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, then the burden to proffer a nondiscriminatory justification shifts to the
defendant).
3. See, e.g., Gallo-Loeks v. US W. Commc'ns, Inc., 57 F. App'x 846, 847-48 (10th
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Such a result is unwarranted in all circumstances.4 Any
careful study of McDonnell Douglas reveals that it is not a
monolithic test but rather a collection of tests gathered
deceptively under one name. While the singular term "McDonnell
Douglas framework" can be used to describe a three-part burden-
shifting framework, use of this general term does not mean that
there is agreement regarding the specific factors that comprise
the test.
One example is the current debate over whether reverse-
discrimination plaintiffs should be required to prove more than
other discrimination plaintiffs to obtain an inference of
discrimination.5 Despite the important policy decisions that
underlie this debate, courts assume, with little discussion, that a
state claim will rely on whatever version of McDonnell Douglas is
being advocated by the particular federal court considering the
issue.6 This truncated analysis ignores the important role that
state law can play in fostering innovation within the field of
employment discrimination law, and diminishes the choices of
sovereign political entities that should be respected.
Not only have federal courts asserted the singularity of
McDonnell Douglas, they have also assumed that state courts
will follow the federal lead regarding the circumstances in which
the test is applicable.7 There is currently wide disagreement in
the federal system about whether McDonnell Douglas should
apply in mixed-motive cases, whether McDonnell Douglas has
been superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, how and
whether the framework should be incorporated into jury
Cir. 2003) (noting the plaintiff did not argue that a different standard would apply to her
state law claims); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801-02 (6th Cir.
1994) (indicating Kentucky law would apply to state law claims and applying the federal
McDonnell Douglas standard because Kentucky law follows the McDonnell Douglas
analysis in "so-called reverse discrimination" cases).
4. See generally Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the Track...". Divergent
Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REV.
469, 483 (2006) (noting the divergence between federal and state employment law is
widening as states begin interpreting their antidiscrimination statutes independently of
federal law).
5. See generally Brenda D. Diluigi, Note, The Notari Alternative: A Better
Approach to the Square-Peg-Round-Hole Problem Found in Reverse Discrimination Cases,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 353, 355-56 (1998) (discussing the varying burdens placed on reverse-
discrimination plaintiffs for proving a prima facie case).
6. See infra Part III.C.1 (examining the various state approaches to reverse-
discrimination standards, and concluding that federal courts in diversity cases often
erroneously assume that the federal standard, rather than the state standard, applies);
see also, e.g., Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 461 F.3d 982, 993 (8th Cir. 2006)
(assuming that the federal McDonnell Douglas framework applies to a Kansas
whistleblower retaliation claim).
7. See infra Part III.C.1.
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instructions, and whether the framework can be expanded to
apply to other statutes.8 Despite this widespread disagreement,
federal courts considering state claims often do not investigate
whether a particular state would weigh in differently on these
matters than the federal court considering the issue.
The beliefs that state courts will apply the same McDonnell
Douglas test, and in the same circumstances as federal courts,
have resulted from generalizations about state law as well as
unwarranted assumptions and incomplete analysis by the courts.
Educating courts and litigants alike about the issues, and
encouraging a more thorough dialogue about the importance of
both state and federal precedent in employment law, can change
these erroneous beliefs.
However, some courts have attempted to memorialize the
dominance of McDonnell Douglas by characterizing it as
procedural for purposes of vertical choice of law,9 a mechanism
that improperly ends the debate on the important questions
about McDonnell Douglas's continuing role in employment
discrimination law. Courts that have justified the application of
McDonnell Douglas to state claims through this choice of law
analysis have reasoned that because McDonnell Douglas is
procedural in nature, federal courts are not required to defer to
state law when exercising diversity or supplemental jurisdiction
over state antidiscrimination claims. 10
This finding is contrary to the Supreme Court's vertical
choice of law jurisprudence1" and undervalues the substantive
diversity that states can and should provide in developing
discrimination laws. Despite the potential federalism problems
that improper vertical choice of law characterization will bring to
employment law, there is little academic commentary on the
intersection of these two principles. The void is so notable that
8. See generally William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace,
41 Hous. L. REV. 1549, 1557-59 (2005) (discussing the applicability of McDonnell Douglas
in various employment discrimination contexts).
9. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090-92 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying the doctrine and progeny of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
which held that federal courts should follow state substantive law but federal procedural
law in diversity of citizenship cases); McEwen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 919 F.2d 58, 59-60
(7th Cir. 1990) (finding the burden-shifting framework of Title VII to be procedural
because it did not affect "the risk of nonpersuasion").
10. See, e.g., Snead, 237 F.3d at 1090-92; McEwen, 919 F.2d at 59-60.
11. Cf Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 416, 427-28 (1996)
(summarizing the emergence and evolution of the "outcome-determinative" test in key
Supreme Court decisions); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965) (indicating that
the determination of whether to apply state procedural law should turn on ensuring
consistency of the resulting decision in both forums to avoid "forum shopping").
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Judge Richard Posner has even mentioned the lack of scholarship
on this topic. 2
To protect the important role of state law in developing
employment discrimination laws, courts must recognize that
McDonnell Douglas is not a monolith, that states have important
contributions to make on the debate regarding what factors
comprise the framework and how the framework should be used,
and that the use of a procedural characterization to apply a
federal framework to state discrimination claims is not
appropriate. Part II of this Article begins by explaining the
important role that state law has played in the development of
employment law. Part III explains how courts have
unintentionally assumed the monolithic nature of McDonnell
Douglas and the consequences this idea has on the development
of frameworks for analyzing discrimination. Part IV discusses
how the improper application of vertical choice of law principles
will undermine continued debate about McDonnell Douglas and
its proper role in employment discrimination litigation. Part V
concludes by urging courts to characterize the test as substantive
for purposes of vertical choice of law and to better recognize the
importance of state law in developing the field of employment
discrimination law.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE LAW IN DEVELOPING
DISCRIMINATION LAW
As a descriptive matter, employment law in the United
States is properly characterized as a form of interactive,
cooperative, or "polyphonic" federalism. The federal
12. Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (noting the lack of "any illuminating scholarly discussions of the issue").
13. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243, 249 (2005) (explaining that, unlike cooperative federalism, "polyphonic"
federalism "recognizes an important role for competition among states and between states
and the federal government"). By making this descriptive claim, the Author does not
intend to make any normative claims about federalism as it relates to employment
discrimination law. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. See Larry
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1485 (1994) ("Talking about
federalism feels a bit like joining the proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant.
It's such a big topic, one can't possibly hope to grasp more than a small part of the
beast."). Additionally, arguing that the federal courts should be more deferential to
notions of federalism is not intended to critique the fact that portions of employment law
have been federalized. Given the history of discrimination within this country and the
likely reluctance of some states to pass any legislation prohibiting employment
discrimination, it is important to have federal laws that provide some liability for
discriminatory conduct. See Alberto B. Lopez, Forty Yeas and Five Nays-The Nays Have
It: Morrison's Blurred Political Accountability and the Defeat of the Civil Rights Provision
of the Violence Against Women Act, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 251, 283 (2001) (suggesting
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government, through statutes such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 4 the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), 5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)"
and amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,17
prohibits certain types of employers from engaging in
discrimination against employees on the basis of the statutorily
defined traits of disability, age, race, color, national origin,
gender, and religion. All fifty states also have enacted statutes
that prohibit discrimination in the workplace.'"
Given the overlay of federal statutes prohibiting
discrimination, some may wonder whether the benefits of state
law can still be feasibly argued in the employment discrimination
context. The limitations of the federal discrimination statutes
clearly demarcate areas where states can and do play an
that the federal government, not the states, "best protects the interests of minority
groups"). However, when enforcing state laws, federal courts should provide due deference
to the states.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
18. See ALA. CODE §§ 25-1-21 to -28 (LexisNexis 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220
(2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1463 to -1465 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-
107(a)(1) (2006); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,920-12,926 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-402 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711
(2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-29 to -35 (2002);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-2 to -3 (LexisNexis 1999); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5909 to
67-5910 (2006); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102 to -105 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp.
2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-3, 22-9-2-2, 22-9-5-19 (LexisNexis 1997); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 216.6 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 344.040-050 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:312, :323, :332, :342, :352,
:368 (1998 & Supp. 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4572-4573 (2002); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, §§ 14, 16 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 2004 & Supp.
2006); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 37.2102, .2202-.2206 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363A.08 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-103, 25-9-149 (West 2003); MO. ANN.
STAT. §§ 213.010, .055 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101, 49-4-303 (2005); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 48-1101 to -1115 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.330-.390 (LexisNexis
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1 to :7 (LexisNexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4,
-12 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-7, 28-1-9 (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. EXEC. LAw
§§ 291, 296 (McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-422.1 to .3 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 14-02.4-03 to 14-02.4-09 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (LexisNexis 2001);
OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1302-1308 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.006, .009, .030
(2005); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-1 to -7 (2003);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-13-10 to -80 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-13-10 (2004); TENN.
CODE. ANN. §§ 4-21-401 to -408 (2005); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.051-.055 (Vernon
2006); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34A-5-101 to -106 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (2003);
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2639 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.040, 49.60.180 (West
2002 & Supp. 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-3, -9 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 111.321-.322 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-101 to -105 (2005).
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important role in developing the law. For example, the term
"employer" is defined under each of the major federal statutes as
only covering those employers with a certain minimum number
of employees. Employees who work for companies with fewer
than fifteen employees do not fall within the protections of Title
VII, and an employer must have at least fifty employees to fall
within the reach of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).19
As a result, individuals who work for smaller employers must
rely on state statutes for discrimination protection."20
Likewise, some federal statutes do not provide the same
incentives for plaintiffs to sue for discrimination. A plaintiff
proceeding under the ADEA cannot recover punitive damages or
emotional distress damages;21 however, many states' statutes
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (2000) (defining the term "employer" under the Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to mean "any person... who employs 50 or more
employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the
current or preceding calendar year"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000) (defining the term
"employer" under Title VII to include only those employers with at least fifteen
employees).
20. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.220, 18.80.300(4) (2004) (applying the
antidiscrimination statute to employers with 1 or more employees within the state); ARK
CODE ANN. §§ 16-123-102(5), 16-123-107 (2006) (9 or more); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12926(d),
12940 (West 1992 & Supp. 2007) (5 or more); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-401(3), 24-34-402
(2006) (1 or more); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-51(10), 46a-60 (West 2004) (3 or more);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710(6), 711 (2005) (4 or more); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-1
to -2 (LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2001) (1 or more); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5902(6), 67-
5909 (2006) (15 or more); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-2 to 22-9-1-3(h) (West 1997) (6 or
more); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 216.2(7), .6 (West 2000) (1 or more); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-
1002(b), -1009 (2000) (4 or more); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.030(2), 344.040 (LexisNexis
2005) (8 or more); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553(4), 4572 (2006) (1 or more); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1(5) (West 2004) (6 or more); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 37.2201(a), 37.2202 (West 2001) (1 or more); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.03(16), 363.08
(West 2004) (1 or more); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010(7), 213.055 (West 2004) (6 or more);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-101(11), 49-2-303 (2005) (1 or more); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 354-A:2(VII), 354-A:7 (LexisNexis 2001) (6 or more); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5(e)
(West 2002) (1 or more); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2(B), 28-1-7 (LexisNexis 2000) (4 or
more); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(5), 296 (McKinney 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-
02(7), 14-02.4-03 (2004) (1 or more); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01(A)(2), 4112.02
(LexisNexis 2001) (4 or more); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.001(4), 659A.006 (2005) (1 or more);
43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 954(b), 955 (West Supp. 2006) (4 or more within state); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-6(7), 28-5-7 (2003) (4 or more); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 20-13-1(7), 20-
13-10 (2004) (1 or more); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-102(4), 4-21-401 (2005) (8 or more);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495, 495d(2) (2001) (1 or more within state); VA. CODE § 2.2-
2639 (2005) (6 or more); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.040(3), 49.60.180 (West 2002 &
Supp 2007) (8 or more); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-3(d), 5-11-9 (LexisNexis 2006) (12 or
more); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.32(6), 111.321, 111.322 (West 2002) (1 or more); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-9-102(b), 27-9-105 (2005) (2 or more).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); see also Comm'r Internal Revenue. v. Schleier, 515
U.S. 323, 325-26 (1995) (explaining the damages available under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA)); Villescas v. Abraham, 311 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002)
(same); Franzoni v. Hartmarx Corp., 300 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2002) (same). Although
punitive damages are not available under the ADEA, plaintiffs may obtain liquidated
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grant age discrimination plaintiffs the ability to recover both
types of damages." Under Title VII, the amount of punitive and
emotional distress damages that a plaintiff may obtain is limited
by statutory caps.23 These caps are not present in some state
statutory schemes.24 As these examples demonstrate, federal
discrimination legislation does not protect all employees and does
not provide plaintiffs with the same remedies as state
counterparts. State discrimination laws, therefore, still play an
important role in this overlapping system of employment
legislation.
When discussing federalism, commentators often list four
common benefits, all of which apply in the employment context.
"[T]hese are public participation, effectuating citizen choice
through competition among jurisdictions, achieving economic
efficiency through competition among jurisdictions, and
encouraging experimentation."25 By discussing each of these
benefits, and the results they have yielded in other portions of
discrimination law, I hope to demonstrate why proper deference
to the states' development of McDonnell Douglas is important.
One of the benefits of our system of federalism is the role
that the states play in serving as a "laboratory" for the
development of legislation.26  This role was perhaps most
eloquently stated by Justice Louis Brandeis when he opined:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may
be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.27
damages if the violation was willful. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000).
22. See, e.g., Morse v. S. Union Co., 174 F.3d 917, 924 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that
punitive damages are available under Missouri's age discrimination statute); Hipp v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (same for Florida);
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Brite, 161 S.W.3d 566, 575 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005)
(same for Texas), rev'd on other grounds, 215 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2007); Pelletier v. Rumpke
Container Serv., 753 N.E.2d 958, 964 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (same for Ohio).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
24. See, e.g., Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997)
(indicating that Missouri law would not apply the same statutory caps as Title VII);
Whitten v. Cross Garage Corp., No. 00-Civ.5333 JSM FM, 2003 WL 21744088, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2003) (same as to New York state discrimination law).
25. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 914 (1994).
26. See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution
Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 908 (2000).
27. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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In other words, states may develop different solutions to
discrimination problems than the federal government and "may
serve as 'laboratories of experimentation' that help identify the
most effective laws."28
These experiments with the contours of employment law can
be seen in many different ways. Given the rather restrictive
definition of "disability" in the federal courts under the ADA,
many states have broadened the definition in their statutes.' 9
While the federal ADEA limits age discrimination claims to those
aged forty or older, some state statutes allow age claims to be
brought by any employee."° While most of the federal statutes do
not allow for individual liability, some of their state counterparts
do provide individual liability.3' These areas demonstrate ways in
which the states are experimenting with different approaches to
employment law.
Scholars also point to the competitive benefits of federalism,
where states attempt to attract businesses or individuals to their
28. Simons, supra note 26, at 908.
29. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12926(k)(1)(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 2007) (defining
a disability as, inter alia, a condition that "limits" a major life activity); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46a-51(15) (2004) (defining disability to include "any chronic physical handicap,
infirmity, or impairment"); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 424 F.3d 1060, 1068-69
(9th Cir. 2005) (discussing differences between the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
definition of disability and the California statute's definition of that term); Beason v.
United Techs. Corp., 337 F.3d 271, 277 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing how the Connecticut
statute's definition of "disability" is broader than the definition provided by the ADA).
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (2004) (not providing an age limit for
discrimination claims); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 2004) (same); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 112.043, 112.044, 760.10 (West 2005) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2
(LexisNexis 1999 & Supp. 2005) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (West 2000) (defining
age discrimination to include individuals at least eighteen years of age); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-1112 to -1113 (2000) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.040, 344.050, 344.060
(LexisNexis 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4571-4572 (2006) (not providing an age
limit for discrimination claims); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 14, 16 (LexisNexis 2003)
(same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202 (West 2001) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 363A.03, 363A.08 (West 2004) (defining age discrimination to include individuals at
least twenty-five years of age); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-102, 49-2-101 (2005) (not
providing an age limit for discrimination claims); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (LexisNexis
2006) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:1, 354-A:6 to :7 (LexisNexis 2001) (same);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (same); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296
(McKinney 2005) (same); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.009, 659A.030 (2005) (same); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (2001) (defining age discrimination to include individuals at least
eighteen years of age). In contrast, some states have placed an upper age limit on age
discrimination claims. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-301, 24-34-402 (2006)
(providing protection to individuals age forty through seventy); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-
21, 45-19-28 to 45-19-29 (2002) (same); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-2-1 to 22-9-2-3 (West
2004) (same); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010, 213.055 (West 2004) (same); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 48-1001, 48-1003 (2004) (same).
31. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 F. App'x 96, 103 (6th Cir. 2004)
(discussing how Title VII does not provide for individual liability but noting that the
Tennessee discrimination statute provides such liability for certain individuals).
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states by developing an attractive package of laws. While such a
competitive paradigm may also promote the so-called "race to the
bottom," in the field of employment discrimination, the federal
discrimination legislation prevents this from occurring, as it
provides incentives for most employers to provide protection
against discrimination.32 Given the federal overlay, in many
instances, the states exhibit "race to the top" behavior, protecting
broader categories of individuals from discrimination than the
federal counterpart.3"
These competitive benefits can be seen in other areas as
well. In many instances, state statutes provide plaintiffs with
additional remedies they would not have under federal
legislation. 4 Given the dissatisfaction with litigation as a
mechanism for resolving discrimination disputes, some states
attempt to resolve discrimination problems primarily through
administrative processes, rather than the litigation-reliant model
provided by the federal system.35
States also foster public participation and provide a
mechanism for citizen choice that is not available at the national
level. While protecting certain types of discriminatory conduct at
the federal level would be politically difficult, citizens in some
states have the political will to effectuate such a choice, and have
done so through state legislation. Thus, "[liocal decisionmakers
are more likely than centralized ones to be attuned to local
concerns and responsive to the local electorate."36 For example,
while no federal statute prohibits employment discrimination in
the private sector based on sexual orientation, several states
have enacted statutes prohibiting such discrimination.37 In a
32. See Michael Mankes, Comment, Combatting Individual Employment
Discrimination in the United States and Great Britain: A Novel Remedial Approach, 16
COMP. LAB. L.J. 67, 115-16 (1994) (indicating that enhanced remedies encourage
employees to come forward with claims and, correspondingly, employers are more likely to
take precautions against discriminatory practices).
33. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 20, 30 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7A-10 to 5/7B-104. (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp.
2003) (providing administrative process for resolution of discrimination claims); Pierson v.
Univ. Orthopedics, S.C., 668 N.E.2d 180, 183 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (explaining that trial
court does not typically have jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the Illinois
Human Rights Act).
36. Simons, supra note 26, at 908.
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,920 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 368-2 (1993)
(prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/1-102A (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West 2002 & Supp.
2007).
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similar vein, some states protect the victims of domestic violence
against discrimination in the workplace."
As these examples demonstrate, the system of federalism
adds diversity to the legal discussion about the contours of
discrimination and how it should be remedied. As discussed
below, similar benefits can be achieved by recognizing that the
federal versions of the McDonnell Douglas standard should not
place a complete stranglehold on state development of the
standard. Before exploring the ways that states can contribute to
this development, it is important to examine the ways in which
the federal courts limit state involvement in this important area
of the law.
III. CREATING AND MAINTAINING THE MONOLITHIC MYTH
Like many myths, the idea that the McDonnell Douglas
standard is a monolith has some basis in fact. It is true that some
states would apply the same McDonnell Douglas standard as
federal courts when addressing particular types of discrimination
claims.39 This basic principle has been embellished over the years
to become an assumption by both courts and litigants that most
states will follow the federal McDonnell Douglas standard and
that this standard is actually a singular enunciation for any
particular type of discrimination case."
Thus, the monolithic myth begins when courts extend the
initial truism in unwarranted ways. First, it appears that in
many cases, both courts and litigants assume that McDonnell
Douglas will apply to state law claims of discrimination based on
circumstantial evidence.41 Second, once this assumption is made,
38. See, e.g., 820 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1 to 180/999 (LexisNexis 1993 & Supp.
2003) (Victims' Economic Security and Safety Act).
39. See, e.g., Adkins v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 7, 16
F. App'x 855, 859-60 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing both federal cases and state cases in support
of using McDonnell Douglas standard); Ross v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 2:04-CV-103,
2006 WL 197137, at *11-14 (D. Vt. Jan. 24, 2006) (same).
40. Some may question whether the benefits of considering the state law concerns
outweigh the complexity and confusion that may result from their recognition. As an
initial matter, vertical choice of law issues often become complex, and the complexity
alone does not warrant the conclusion that the courts should rely on a faulty, but simpler
way of addressing issues. Additionally, other problems with the McDonnell Douglas
standard warrant proper application of state law to state law claims when that law differs
from McDonnell Douglas. See generally Sandra Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis:
Why McDonnell Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43
HoUs. L. REV. 743 (2006).
41. See, e.g., Acree v. Tyson Bearing Co., 128 F. App'x 419, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2005)
(assuming that the McDonnell Douglas framework applied to age discrimination cases
under Kentucky state law).
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the federal courts engage in scant analysis about whether the
state has articulated the same McDonnell Douglas standard as
the federal court.42 There are several key areas of employment
discrimination law where such an assumption is unwarranted,
and where employment law could benefit from a broader
discussion about applicable proof standards. It is important to
analyze the legal reasoning, or lack thereof, that allows
perpetuation of this monolithic belief about McDonnell Douglas,
even where such a belief is clearly not appropriate.
A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
Before discussing whether state laws conform to the federal
McDonnell Douglas standard, it is important to understand the
history and development of the standard itself. In 1973, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether Percy Green, a
former McDonnell Douglas employee, could proceed on his
failure-to-hire claims based on circumstantial evidence.43 In
affirming Mr. Green's ability to proceed on such evidence, the
Supreme Court also laid out its now familiar three-part burden-
shifting framework to aid the lower courts in the consideration of
circumstantial evidence." To prevail on a claim of discrimination
based on circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff is required to first:
carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a
prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done
by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.45
The burden then shifts to the employer "to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
rejection."46 The plaintiff is then provided the "opportunity to
42. See, e.g., Higgins v. Johnson County Med. Labs. Inc., No. 95-2295-JWL, 1996
WL 707102, at *3 n.5 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 1996) (assuming that McDonnell Douglas
standard would apply to Kansas antidiscrimination statute).
43. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803-04 (1973).
44. At the time, plaintiffs bringing claims under Title VII did not have the right to a
jury trial. The right to a jury trial was added in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)
(2000)); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 692 (2004) (discussing addition of
right to jury trial).
45. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
46. Id.
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show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection
was in fact pretext."47 The court noted that the facts required to
prove a prima facie case will vary depending on the factual
• 48
scenario.
The Supreme Court characterized the McDonnell Douglas
case as addressing the "proper order and nature of proof'
required to establish discrimination under Title VII. 45 And, in
subsequent decisions, the Court has bolstered this rationale by
indicating that the decision was rendered "according to
traditional practice" that provides the Court with the ability to
"establish certain modes and orders of proof."50 The Court also
later described the McDonnell Douglas standard as a "procedural
device,"5 as "merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the
evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination,"52  and as simply a means of
"arranging the presentation of evidence." 3
Over the past forty years the McDonnell Douglas framework
has become the most widely used method for evaluating,
ordering, and structuring the presentation of circumstantial
evidence of discrimination in Title VII cases.54 The test is now
used when analyzing claims under the ADA,5 the ADEA,56 and
discrimination cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 57 And,
most importantly for purposes of this Article, the McDonnell
Douglas standard has been used to determine whether
discrimination is established under various state
58antidiscrimination statutes. Unfortunately, neither litigants nor
47. Id. at 804.
48. Id. at 802 n.13.
49. Id. at 793-94.
50. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993).
51. Id. at 521.
52. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
53. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); see also
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (holding McDonnell Douglas is an
evidentiary standard and not a pleading requirement).
54. But see Michael Evan Gold, Towards a Unified Theory of the Law of
Employment Discrimination, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175 (2001) (arguing that
McDonnell Douglas is just one of several methods of proving discrimination through
indirect evidence).
55. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 (2003).
56. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).
57. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 & n.1 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Gamboa v. Am. Airlines, 170 F. App'x 610, 612 (lth Cir. 2006)
(applying McDonnell Douglas standard to claims asserted under a Florida
antidiscrimination statute); Gentry v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 250 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2001)
(same under Arkansas law); Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 1999)
(same under New Mexico law); Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d
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the courts have fully explored when and how concepts of state
law should come into play when the federal courts impose the
McDonnell Douglas standard to state antidiscrimination laws.
Even though courts routinely recognize that the McDonnell
Douglas standard is malleable and must be tailored to fit the
factual scenario before the court,59 courts give little consideration
to the idea that state courts might create a McDonnell Douglas
test different from the one created by federal courts.
B. Examining the Origins of the Monolithic Standard
The continuing belief that McDonnell Douglas is a
monolithic standard (at least within a given type of
discrimination claim) appears to be maintained by both attorneys
and judges through two common errors-an assumption that
McDonnell Douglas is applicable to state law claims and a failure
to examine whether the term "McDonnell Douglas framework"
refers to the same test under both federal and state law.
In some cases, litigants and courts simply assume that, in
any given case, McDonnell Douglas should be applied to claims
under a state antidiscrimination statute.' In many cases, it
appears that the courts reach this conclusion without any
reference to either the applicable state statute or to state case
law interpreting the statute. For example, in one case, the court
merely indicated that McDonnell Douglas is a "well-accepted
legal framework" and applied it to all of the plaintiffs
discrimination claims.61
Cir. 1999) (same under New York law); Carpenter v. Fed. Natl Mortgage Ass'n, 165 F.3d
69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same under District of Columbia law); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164
F.3d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 1999) (same under Massachusetts law); King v. Herbert J. Thomas
Mem'l Hosp., 159 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1998) (same under West Virginia law); Lee v.
Minn. Dep't of Commerce, 157 F.3d 1130, 1133 (8th Cir. 1998) (same under Minnesota
law); Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1998) (same under
Louisiana law); Olson v. Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 956 (3d Cir. 1996) (same
under New Jersey law); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 n.8 (6th
Cir. 1994) (same under Kentucky law).
59. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) ("[Tlhe
prima facie proof required ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
fact situations."); see also Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358
(1977).
60. See, e.g., Acree v. Tyson Bearing Co., 128 F. App'x 419, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2005)
("Although the Kentucky Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to age discrimination cases under
the [Kentucky Civil Rights Act], the parties do not dispute the issue and we will therefore
assume that it does."); Higgins v. Johnson County Med. Labs. Inc., No. 95-2295-JWL,
1996 WL 707102, at *3 n.5 (D. Kan. Nov. 15, 1996) (assuming that McDonnell Douglas
standard would apply to Kansas antidiscrimination statute).
61. Higgins, 1996 WL 707102, at *3 n.5 (noting that the parties had failed to fully
brief the applicable legal standards).
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Of course, in many instances, this assumption would be
correct, as many state courts have held that some version of the
McDonnell Douglas standard applies to certain types of state
claims.62 However, it would be preferable if courts would simply
cite the applicable state case to support their assumption. In
cases where the state court has not yet ruled on a McDonnell
Douglas issue, the federal court should engage in some analysis
regarding how it reached its decision that the state court would
use the federal standard."3
In other cases, the courts appear to at least cite state law or
another federal case in support of the concept that McDonnell
Douglas is applicable to claims brought pursuant to a state
discrimination statute. 4 However, in these cases the courts do
62. See, e.g., Bd. of Edu. of Chi. v. Cady, 860 N.E.2d 526, 535 (Ill. App. 2006)
(allowing plaintiffs to indirectly prove discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas
standard); see also Farrugia v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 820 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726-27 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2006) (requiring only a de minimus showing to establish a prima facie case and shift
the burden of proof); James v. Bob Ross Buick, 855 N.E.2d 119, 125-26 (Ohio Ct. App.
2006) (leveraging the McDonnell Douglas framework to avoid difficulties in proving
discrimination).
63. Cf Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943) ("[Tlhis Court has not
hesitated to decide questions of state law when necessary for the disposition of a case
brought to it for decision, although the highest court of the state had not answered them,
the answers were difficult, and the character of the answers which the highest state
courts might ultimately give remained uncertain."); Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent
Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining when a state court has not yet
ruled on an issue of state substantive law, federal court sitting in diversity must attempt
to determine how the state's highest court would resolve the issue).
64. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying
McDonnell Douglas under claims brought pursuant to New York state and New York City
antidiscrimination provisions); McClain v. Nw. Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Judicial Corr. Bd., 440
F.3d 320, 332 (6th Cir. 2006) (same as to Ohio); Baucom v. Holiday Cos., 428 F.3d 764,
766 (8th Cir. 2005) (same as to Minnesota); Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d 756, 764
(8th Cir. 2005) (same as to Missouri); Thomas v. Owen Elec. Coop., Inc., 121 F. App'x 598,
601 (6th Cir. 2005) (same as to Kentucky); Succarde v. Fed. Express Corp., 106 F. App'x
335, 339 (6th Cir. 2004) (same as to Michigan); Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 F. App'x
96, 103 (6th Cir. 2004) (same as to Tennessee); Wellner v. Town of Westport, 35 F. App'x.
14, 15 (2d Cir. 2002) (same as to Connecticut); Bishop v. Bell Atl. Corp., 299 F.3d 53, 58
n.3 (1st Cir. 2002) (same as to Maine); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,
1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (same as to Hawaii); Gentry v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 250 F.3d 646, 650 (8th
Cir. 2001) (same as to Arkansas); LaBlanche v. Univ. of Iowa, Coll. of Med., 1 F. App'x
574, 575 (8th Cir. 2001) (same as to Iowa); Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 162 F.3d 653, 659 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1998) (same as to Florida); Ray v. City of
Puyallup, No. 04-5475, 2006 WL 581085, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6, 2006) (same as to
Washington); Williams v. City of Harrisburg, No. 1:CV-03-2339, 2005 WL 2335131, at *5
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2005) (same as to Pennsylvania); Jenkins v. Duke Energy Field Servs.,
L.L.C., No. 04-404, 2005 WL 2123544, at *1 (W.D. La. Sept. 1, 2005) (same as to
Louisiana); Rosenberger v. Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 03CV2412WDMPA, 2005 WL
1994239, at *4 (D. Colo. Aug. 15, 2005) (same as to Colorado); St. Hilaire v. The Pep
Boys-Manny, Moe and Jack, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1358-59 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (same as to
Florida); Schmucker v. Data-Link Sys., Inc., No. 3:96-CV-138RP, 1997 WL 348061, at *6
(N.D. Ind. June 5, 1997) (same as to Indiana). Some courts appear to be more careful in
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not undertake any analysis to determine whether the McDonnell
Douglas standard articulated by the state court is the same
standard that the federal court would apply. In fact, some courts
refer to the standard as "the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
test," suggesting that a singular test exists.65 As discussed in Part
III.C below, this is not the case.
Failure to provide more than a cursory citation to state law
leads to situations like the one that currently exists in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey. In ruling on New
Jersey state law discrimination claims, one judge in the district
has explained in at least four separate opinions that "the New
Jersey Supreme Court has adopted the McDonnell Douglas test
for claims under all state proscriptions against discrimination,
both statutory and constitutional."66 These cases cite to a 1978
New Jersey Supreme Court case for this proposition but provide
no discussion of the referenced case. Another judge in the same
district has provided the same explanation of the law in New
Jersey, citing both the 1978 New Jersey Supreme Court decision
and a 1990 decision from the same court.8
While it is true that New Jersey state courts will apply a
version of the McDonnell Douglas framework to some types of
discrimination claims, the state's courts have "refused to apply
the McDonnell Douglas framework in [state law discrimination]
cases alleging gender discrimination in the form of unequal pay;
modified the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
in the context of reverse-discrimination failure-to-hire cases; and
shifted to employers the burden of proving the validity of their
decisions in some handicap discrimination cases."69 By ignoring
their analysis, providing both federal and state citations for each prong of the McDonnell
Douglas framework. See, e.g., Adkins v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union,
Local 7, 16 F. App'x 855, 859-60 (10th Cir. 2001); Ross v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No.
2:04-CV-103, 2006 WL 197137, at *11 (D. Vt. Jan. 24, 2006).
65. Bash v. City of Galena, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1183 n.7 (D. Kan. 1999) (emphasis
added); see also Schmucker, 1997 WL 348061, at *6 (proceeding under the "McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting method").
66. O'Toole v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., No. 04-1730 (SRC), 2006 WL 3019698, at
*2 (D. N.J. Oct. 23, 2006); Cutrona v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, No. 03-1886 (JAG), 2006
WL 1877134, at *3 (D. N.J. July 6, 2006); Hutchinson v. Bennigan's/Metromedia Rest.,
Inc., No. 02-5364JAG, 2006 WL 477003, at *3 (D. N.J. Feb. 28, 2006) (citing Peper v.
Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 389 A.2d 465, 479 (N.J. 1978)); Massaro v. Port Auth., No. 04-
1548JAG, 2005 WL 3077918, at *4 (D. N.J. Nov. 14, 2005).
67. Hutchinson, 2006 W L 477003, at *3 (citing Peper, 389 A.2d at 479); Massaro,
2005 WL 3077918, at *4 (citing Peper, 389 A.2d at 479).
68. McConnell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 356, 362 (D. N.J. 1999)
(citing Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 798 (N.J. 1990); Peper, 389 A.2d
at 479).
69. McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 828 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
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that the term "McDonnell Douglas" can refer to many different
tests, the federal courts in New Jersey risk oversimplifying state
discrimination claims and ignoring the vast differences that exist
between state and federal standards for evaluating certain types
of discriminatory conduct.
Even recognition by the courts that legitimate differences
might exist between state and federal McDonnell Douglas
standards does not always result in the required deference to the
state standard. In some cases, the courts appear to recognize
differences between the state and federal law but are dismissive
of the state interests at stake. In one case, the court analyzed the
plaintiffs claims under McDonnell Douglas and then continued
with an analysis of the plaintiffs Oregon discrimination claims. °
Although the court recognized that Oregon would not apply the
burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas to the state
claims, the court granted summary judgment in defendant's
favor after simply stating that "the amount and type of evidence
that plaintiff must produce to survive summary judgment under
[Oregon law] is substantially similar to that required under Title
VII."7' The court did not discuss the differences between the
federal and state standards; nor did it provide any citation to
Oregon law for the proposition that the amount and type of
evidence the plaintiff would need to produce would be similar.72
C. Discussing Federalism Through Specific Examples
By assuming that state courts will apply federal standards
to discrimination claims, federal courts are depriving the
employment discrimination field of a much-needed dialogue
about how discrimination claims should be proved. This Part
discusses three specific areas in employment law in which the
federal courts have not yet decided how the McDonnell Douglas
test operates. In each of these areas, there is wide disagreement
among the federal courts about how the issue should be resolved.
As would be expected, similar differences exist among state
courts.
Despite the federal courts' growing recognition that
substantive disagreements exist about the application of
McDonnell Douglas in certain contexts, in many instances these
same courts presume that a state court will simply follow the
lead of the particular federal court in resolving the issue. Time
70. Price v. Taco Bell Corp., 934 F. Supp. 1193, 1202-04 (D. Or. 1996).
71. Id. at 1204.
72. Id. at 1203-04.
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after time, the federal courts fail to even consider, let alone
discuss, whether the state court would reach a different result on
these important conflicts.
1. Examining Reverse-Discrimination Standards. The
McDonnell Douglas standard is currently in a state of flux in
reverse-discrimination cases.73 As described below, the federal
circuit courts currently disagree about whether plaintiffs in
reverse-discrimination cases must prove additional facts, beyond
those required by the typical prima facie case, to gain the
presumption of discrimination.74 Although few states appear to
have expressly addressed this issue, a split exists among those
courts that have. Surprisingly, neither courts nor litigants
appear to be using vertical choice of law arguments to push state
reverse-discrimination laws toward or away from the various
stances taken by the federal courts. This is especially startling
because there are important policy issues at stake regarding the
underlying purposes of antidiscrimination statutes.
In the McDonnell Douglas case itself, the Supreme Court
articulated that to proceed on the first prong of the test, the
plaintiff had to establish that he is a member of a racial
minority.75 Initially, some circuit courts interpreted the first
prong of McDonnell Douglas to require a plaintiff to prove
membership in a historically discriminated-against protected
class.76 Under this interpretation of the first prong, however,
other courts reasoned that "'applying the McDonnell Douglas
73. The Author recognizes that there is debate within the academy about whether
the term "reverse discrimination" is appropriate. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to
the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII
Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1135 n.13 (2004) (describing discussion over use of
terminology). The use of the term "reverse discrimination" is not intended to imply that a
distinction between reverse-discrimination claims and other types of discrimination
claims should exist. Rather, this Section is merely designed to argue that important policy
issues underlie how reverse-discrimination claims should proceed, and the states should
be allowed to play a role in this debate.
74. A discussion about how this split should be resolved is outside the scope of the
Article. The Author is more interested in how the parties can use vertical choice of law to
differentiate the standard used in state reverse-discrimination claims from the one
applied to federal claims. For scholarly treatments of the question of how and whether the
McDonnell Douglas standard should be modified in reverse-discrimination cases, see
generally Sullivan, supra note 73, at 1118-29; Darren D. McClain, Comment, Racial
Discrimination Against the Majority in Hiring Practices: Courts' Misguided Attempts to
Make Race-Conscious Law Color Blind, 30 STET. L. REV. 755, 786-93 (2000).
75. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
76. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co., 509 F.2d 48, 51 (8th Cir. 1975);
Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wis. Steel Works of Int'l
Harvest Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1317 n.3 (7th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that Title VII required a
plaintiff to show "that he belongs to a racial minority").
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standard literally in reverse-discrimination cases such as this
would prevent any plaintiff from making out a prima facie
case."' 77 At the same time, these courts recognized that the
explicit language of Title VII did not limit its protections to
historically discriminated-against groups.8
Recognizing the malleability of the McDonnell Douglas test,
some federal courts require that those seeking to prove a case of
reverse discrimination establish "'background circumstances'
sufficient to demonstrate that the particular employer has
'reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously against whites'
or evidence that 'there is something "fishy" about the facts at
hand.
79
The rationale behind such a test is an assumption that
reverse discrimination rarely happens and therefore, these
litigants should be required to prove more than a member of a
historically discriminated against group to obtain an inference of
discrimination. As one court indicated: "Invidious racial
discrimination against whites is relatively uncommon in our
society, and so there is nothing inherently suspicious in an
employer's decision to promote a qualified minority applicant
instead of a qualified white applicant."'
Some courts have rejected the idea that reverse-
discrimination plaintiffs should be required to establish
additional facts to proceed on their claims. Under the Third
Circuit's articulation "all that should be required to establish a
prima facie case in the context of 'reverse discrimination' is for
the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to
conclude that the employer is treating some people less favorably
than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title
VII."8" Likewise, the Fifth Circuit refuses to hold reverse-
77. Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hill
v. Burrell Commc'ns. Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1995), overruled on other
grounds by O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996)) (discussing a
"background circumstances" standard); see also Sullivan, supra note 73, at 1039
(discussing the Supreme Court's holding in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 280 (1976), that "Title VII protects everyone").
78. See, e.g., Hague, 436 F.3d at 821.
79. Id. (quoting Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2005)).
80. Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Gore v. Ind. Univ.,
416 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that "it 'is the unusual employer who
discriminates against majority employees'" (quoting Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171
F.3d 450, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1999))); Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 256
(6th Cir. 2002) (providing the equivalent for 6th Circuit).
81. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Haley v. City of
Plainfield, 169 F. App'x 670, 672 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the same standard). Notably,
the Tenth Circuit has adopted a test that appears to combine the tests used by the
Seventh and Third Circuits, allowing a reverse-discrimination plaintiff to prevail either
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discrimination plaintiffs to a higher burden than other
plaintiffs." However, unlike the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
merely holds reverse-discrimination plaintiffs to the same prima
facie case as other discrimination litigants.83
Without guidance from the circuit court, district courts in
the Second Circuit are in disarray, with some applying a stricter
standard for reverse-discrimination claims, and others applying
the more relaxed standard 4
The Third Circuit has explicitly rejected the reasoning that
those asserting reverse-discrimination claims should be required
to come forth with extra evidence to survive summary judgment
and has indicated that such an approach is both "problematic
and unnecessary. "85 The Sixth Circuit, which has required
reverse-discrimination plaintiffs to establish "background
circumstances," has questioned the policy implications of such a
choice. It noted: "We have serious misgivings about the
soundness of a test which imposes a more onerous standard for
plaintiffs who are white or male than for their non-white or
female counterparts. '"8
Surveying the landscape of reverse-discrimination cases,
there is clearly no consensus regarding whether the traditional
McDonnell Douglas approach applies or whether some
modification of the test is necessary to make the test's
presumptions meaningful. Even the circuits that agree on
whether the plaintiff should or should not be required to make an
additional showing do not agree about the test that should be
applied to reflect this policy decision.
As would be expected, state law is equally muddled
regarding the appropriate standard to apply in reverse-
discrimination cases, even for states within the geographic area
by showing additional background circumstances or "'indirect evidence sufficient to
support a reasonable probability, that but for the plaintiffs status the challenged
employment decision would have favored the plaintiff." Lyons v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 130
F. App'x 953, 954 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th
Cir. 2004)).
82. Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000)
(analyzing the plaintiffs prima facie case and rejecting the employer's argument that the
plaintiff should also have to prove that he was a "racial minority at his place of work").
83. Id. Courts within the Eleventh Circuit also apply the traditional McDonnell
Douglas test to reverse-discrimination claims. E.g., Turner v. Bieluch, No. 03-81058-CIV-
HURLEY, 03-81059-CIV-HOPKINS, 2004 WL 2044291, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2004).
84. Brierly v. Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 359 F. Supp. 2d 275, 294 n.7
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing cases applying various standards to reverse-discrimination cases
and noting the absence of a Second Circuit determination of the issue).
85. ladimarco, 190 F.3d at 161.
86. Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 801 n.7 (6th Cir. 1994).
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of the same federal court of appeals. Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan
and Tennessee all fall within the Sixth Circuit's jurisdiction.
Michigan has explicitly rejected the addition of a background
circumstances prong to the McDonnell Douglas test, indicating
that the explicit words of its antidiscrimination statute do not
provide for application of different legal standards, depending on
the protected class of the individual litigant." Likewise, a
Tennessee appellate court applied the traditional test to a
reverse-discrimination claim.8 However, under both Kentucky
and Ohio law, a plaintiff attempting to proceed on a reverse-
discrimination claim is required to establish that additional
background circumstances support his claim.89
The Sixth Circuit has recognized that states within the
circuit have different reverse-discrimination standards.9° Despite
this recognition, it is interesting to discuss how the Sixth Circuit
deals with reverse-discrimination statutes brought under
Tennessee's antidiscrimination statute.8 '
In Leadbetter v. Gilley,92 the Sixth Circuit considered
reverse-discrimination claims brought under both Title VII and
the Tennessee discrimination statute.93 In ruling on the claims,
the Sixth Circuit applied its own reverse-discrimination test to
both the federal and state claims, which required the plaintiff to
establish additional background circumstances to demonstrate
the defendant "was the unusual employer who discriminates
against men . .. ." The Sixth Circuit applied this standard
without any separate discussion about whether a different
standard should be applied to the Tennessee state law claims and
failed to discuss a Tennessee court of appeals decision that
reached the opposite result.9"
87. See Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. 2004) (holding that
drawing such a distinction would be "clearly contrary to the language of Michigan's Civil
Rights Act").
88. Wilson v. Rubin, 104 S.W.3d 39, 53 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).
89. Stathis v. Univ. of Ky., No. 2004-CA-000556-MR, 2005 WL 1125240, at *5 (Ky.
Ct. App. May 13, 2005); Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 01-CA22-2, 2001 WL 1913820,
at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2001).
90. See Dabrowski v. Dow Chem., No. 06-11037-BC, 2007 WL 201047, at *3 n.2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2007) (noting Michigan's rejection of the background circumstances
test).
91. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 to 4-21-1004 (2005).
92. Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2004).
93. Id. at 688.
94. Id. at 690.
95. Id. at 690-91; see also Thompson v. City of Memphis, 86 F. App'x 96, 103 (6th
Cir. 2004) (applying higher standard to reverse-discrimination claims brought under
Tennessee law without any discussion of underlying Tennessee law).
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In another reverse-discrimination case brought under
Tennessee law and federal law, the defendant did not argue that
the Sixth Circuit's higher standard for reverse discrimination
should apply.9" The Sixth Circuit applied the same articulation of
the McDonnell Douglas test as it would apply in a traditional
discrimination case to both the federal claims and the state
claims.97  Explaining its application of federal law to the
Tennessee claims, the court noted: "[Als they are coextensive, the
Title VII analysis subsumes the claims under the counterpart
Tennessee statute."98 The court did not cite any Tennessee
reverse-discrimination case to support this proposition.
Clearly, the underlying Tennessee law on reverse-
discrimination claims does not change depending on the three-
judge panel that is considering the claim,99 but this is the result
that follows from an analysis that is all too common in
employment cases. The court simply cites a state case indicating
that it is appropriate to refer to federal law or McDonnell
Douglas when analyzing state claims, and then assumes that the
federal law is monolithic.' 0 Such an assumption is inappropriate
and leads to fragmented rulings where the state law changes
depending on which court is ruling on the claim.
This result is especially surprising in the Sixth Circuit for
several reasons. First, the states within the circuit are divided
regarding the prima facie case to be applied in reverse-
discrimination cases.' Second, at least one court in the Sixth
96. Willoughby v. Allstate Ins. Co., 104 F. App'x 528, 530 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004).
97. Id. at 530 & n. 1.
98. Id. at 530 n.1.
99. In the court's defense, it may have simply been relying on the arguments of the
parties in both cases. However, this merely points to an additional problem with the
perception of McDonnell Douglas, in that one of the litigants in each case failed to argue
for a legal standard that would better assist the client. In Leadbetter, the plaintiff should
have argued-based on the prior ruling by the Tennessee Court of Appeals-that the
traditional McDonnell Douglas prima facie case applied. Compare Leadbetter 385 F.3d at
688 (arguing for relief under Title VII and the Tennessee discrimination statute), with
Wilson v. Rubin, 104 S.W.3d 39, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that under McDonnell
Douglas, a prima facie case can give rise to a rebuttable presumption of age or gender
discrimination).
100. See, e.g., Willoughby, 104 F. App'x at 530 & n.1 (citing Thompson v. City of
Memphis, 86 F. App'x 96, 103 (6th Cir. 2004)).
101. See Sutherland v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 220 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (outlining the elements required for proving a prima facie reverse-discrimination
case under Michigan state law); Ekstrom v. Cuyahoga County Cmty. Coll., 779 N.E.2d
1067, 1074 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (listing elements of prima facie case under Ohio state
antidiscrimination law that differ from those in Michigan); see also Leadbetter, 385 F.3d
at 690 (applying the McDonnell Douglas test to a reverse-discrimination claim in
Tennessee); Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 n.8 (6th Cir. 1994)
("Kentucky courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to discrimination cases
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Circuit has explicitly recognized that differences exist between
Michigan law and the Sixth Circuit's reverse-discrimination
standard and that Michigan courts have applied the different
standards in some cases. Finally, although the Sixth Circuit
requires plaintiffs in reverse-discrimination cases brought under
Title VII to prove additional background circumstances, it also
has expressed some doubts about its position, leading to the
natural conclusion that the Sixth Circuit is fully aware of the
policy decisions that underlie choosing one prima facie
articulation over another.
03
However, the Sixth Circuit is not alone in this type of
decisionmaking. Recall that the district courts within the Second
Circuit disagree about which reverse-discrimination standard to
employ.'4 Despite this difference, these courts continue to assert
that the state law will follow federal law regarding reverse
discrimination, and then apply the particular version of the
federal standard that the court has adopted.' As with the cases
in the Sixth Circuit, this results in different standards for
reverse discrimination being applied to New York state law
cases, without any recognition of the dichotomy.'0 6
Underlying the debate about which standard to apply to
reverse-discrimination cases are substantive issues that go to the
core of the definition of discrimination itself. Although perhaps a
slight simplification, this debate revolves around two competing
views of employment in the United States-one that believes
that individuals in the majority rarely face discrimination and
another that believes that such discrimination is likely to occur.107
brought under state law.").
102. Dabrowski v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 06-11037-BC, 2007 WL 201047, at *3 n.2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 24, 2007) (citing Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich.
2004)) (recognizing that the Michigan Supreme Court had rejected the background
circumstances requirement).
103. See Pierce, 40 F.3d at 801 n.7 (expressing "serious misgivings about the
soundness" of the additional background circumstances requirement).
104. Brierly v. Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 359 F. Supp. 2d 275, 294 n.7
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing cases applying various standards to reverse-discrimination cases
and noting the absence of a Second Circuit determination of the issue); Stepheny v.
Brooklyn Hebrew Sch. for Special Children, 356 F. Supp. 2d 248, 259 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(same).
105. Stepheny, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (applying "Title VII jurisprudence"); Ticali v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 41 F. Supp. 2d 249, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to
apply a "modified McDonnell Douglas formulation").
106. Stepheny, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (applying typical McDonnell Douglas standard
to reverse-discrimination claims); Ticali, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 261 (refusing to apply typical
McDonnell Douglas standard, but requiring proof of additional background
circumstances).
107. Sullivan, supra note 73, at 1085.
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States should be allowed to consider the policy implications
relating to their state discrimination statutes, and the federal
courts should respect these decisions about how reverse-
discrimination claims are evaluated.
To date, both litigants and courts have largely ignored both
the strategic and policy advantages that can be gained from
using vertical choice of law to distinguish the varying McDonnell
Douglas tests used in reverse-discrimination cases. As the debate
over the appropriate standard continues, federal courts should
show the required deference to interests of state law by
recognizing that differences exist and by not blindly applying a
specific, federal McDonnell Douglas standard to reverse-
discrimination claims under state law.
2. Examining the Application of Desert Palace and the
1991 Amendments to Title VII to State Law Claims. Similar
disarray exists within the federal court system regarding
whether the McDonnell Douglas framework was modified by the
1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act and the Supreme
Court's decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. °8
To better understand the substantive issues created by this
disagreement, it is important to understand the historic
development of the problem. As originally enacted, Title VII
prohibited discrimination "because of' certain protected traits.'0 9
Based on this language, it was unclear whether plaintiffs could
proceed on a mixed-motive theory of discrimination, essentially
arguing that both lawful and unlawful motives drove the
employer's decision.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court
determined that mixed-motive claims could proceed under Title
VII."0 However, there was disagreement among the justices
about how such claims should proceed, specifically whether
plaintiffs should be required to provide direct evidence of
discrimination to establish a claim of mixed-motive
discrimination."' Additionally, the Price Waterhouse decision
established an affirmative defense to liability for mixed-motive
claims. An employer would be able to completely escape liability
108. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
110. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (concluding that
employer is not liable if it can show that other factors would have led to the same hiring
decision).
111. See id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the plurality opinion
that requires employers to submit direct evidence to meet their burden of production in
mixed-motive cases).
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for mixed-motive discrimination if it could prove that the same
employment action would have been taken absent the
discriminatory motive."'
In response to the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to make it clear that
plaintiffs could prevail on discrimination claims-even if a
discriminatory reason did not wholly motivate the employer-if
the plaintiff could establish the protected trait "was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.""' At the same time, Congress also
provided employers with a limited affirmative defense under
Title VII. If the employer can establish that it would have taken
the "same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor," it can restrict a plaintiffs damages to injunctive and
declaratory relief, attorney's fees and costs." 4 This was a
significant change from the Price Waterhouse formulation, which
allowed the employer to completely escape liability upon proof of
the defense.
After the 1991 amendments to Title VII, it remained unclear
whether plaintiffs could proceed on a mixed-motive claim without
direct evidence of discrimination. In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,
the Supreme Court resolved this question by deciding that
plaintiffs could proceed under a mixed-motive framework using
direct or circumstantial evidence."' After Desert Palace and the
passage of the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, courts
began to consider whether the McDonnell Douglas framework
should continue to function in the same manner as it had in the
past.16
Currently, the federal law is in a state of flux regarding the
intersection of the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the Desert
Palace decision, and the McDonnell Douglas test."7 Some courts
112. Id. at 252, 258.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000); see also Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1033 (2006).
115. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003).
116. See, e.g., Harris v. Giant Eagle Inc., 133 F. App'x 288, 297 (6th Cir. 2005)
(observing that the Sixth Circuit had not yet had an opportunity to address any
modifications to the burden-shifting framework as a result of the Desert Palace decision).
117. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 73, at 934 ("The ramifications of Desert Palace are
as yet unclear, but the broadest view is that the case collapsed all individual disparate
treatment cases into a single analytical method, thereby effectively destroying McDonnell
Douglas. The decision, however, can be read more narrowly. Because footnote one
specifies that the Court was not deciding the effects of this decision 'outside of the mixed-
motive context,' McDonnell Douglas may continue to structure some cases, although its
viability under Title VII is suspect." (footnotes omitted)); William R. Corbett, An Allegory
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have held that McDonnell Douglas was not affected by the 1991
amendments or the Desert Palace decision.1 ' Other courts have
indicated that the third prong of the McDonnell Douglas test
should be modified to allow the plaintiff either to prove pretext or
mixed-motive."' Some courts take a third approach to this
question, indicating that McDonnell Douglas is no longer a viable
method for proving discrimination.
2 0
Likewise, questions also remain about whether the 1991
amendments and Desert Palace apply to claims brought under
other federal discrimination statutes. Some circuits have refused
to apply the Desert Palace standard to claims brought under
other discrimination statutes, reasoning that if Congress had
intended for such claims to proceed, it would have made similar
amendments to the other federal discrimination statutes. 2' Some
courts have reasoned that mixed-motive claims are viable under
other discrimination statutes, but that these claims should
proceed under the Price Waterhouse framework. 122 Some circuits
of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1549, 1566 (2005) (hoping to "dispel
the shadow of McDonnell Douglas's continuing viability once and for all"); Jeffrey A. Van
Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roid". An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell
Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72-73 (2003) (asserting that
McDonnell Douglas is 'dead as a doornail'" (citing CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS
CAROL 1 (John C. Winston Co. 1938) (1849))); but see Christopher R. Hedican, Jason M.
Hedican, & Mark P.A. Hudson, McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L. REV.
383, 425 (2004) ("[T]he decision in Costa amply demonstrates that McDonnell Douglas is
alive and well.").
118. See, e.g., Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir.
2005) (explaining that Desert Palace does not change McDonnell Douglas in the summary
judgment context); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004)
(limiting Desert Palace to jury instruction issues, rather than summary judgment issues).
119. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
120. See, e.g., Rollins v. Mo. Dep't. of Conservation, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1023 (W.D.
Mo. 2004) (questioning validity of McDonnell Douglas and applying it reluctantly because
the outcome would be the same whether or not it is used at the summary judgment stage);
Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994 (D. Minn. 2003) (declining to
apply McDonnell Douglas to single-motive claims). It should be noted that the Eighth
Circuit has consistently reiterated the continued viability of McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g.,
Strate, 398 F.3d at 1017 (allowing plaintiff who lacks proof of motive to avoid summary
judgment by using the McDonnell Douglas test); Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735-36 (stating that
"Desert Palace did not forecast a sea change" in the McDonnell Douglas standard).
121. See, e.g., Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 745 n.13 (4th Cir. 2006) (indicating
that Desert Palace analysis does not apply to claims under the ADEA); Aquino v. Honda of
Am., Inc., 158 F. App'x 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to apply Desert Palace standard
to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because Congress chose not to amend that
statute); Bolander v. BP Oil Co., No. 3:02CV7341, 2003 WL 22060351, at *3 (N.D. Ohio
Aug. 6, 2003) (indicating Desert Palace does not apply to ADEA).
122. See, e.g., Baqir, 434 F.3d at 745 n.13 (noting that "ADEA mixed motive cases
remain subject to the Price Waterhouse analysis"); Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 391
F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2004).
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have applied the Desert Palace framework to claims under other
federal discrimination statutes.23
Given the difficulties in resolving issues relating to the
intersection of McDonnell Douglas, Desert Palace, Price
Waterhouse, and the 1991 amendments to Title VII, it is not
surprising that state courts are also in disarray regarding the
proper test for resolving circumstantial evidence claims. It is also
important to keep in mind that the state legislatures often did
not modify their state discrimination suits to model them after
the 1991 amendments to Title VII," 4 so questions remain about
whether it is appropriate to interpret these state statutes
through the lens of Desert Palace and Title ViI's 1991
amendments.
Courts in some states have specifically rejected the
application of a different framework to single-motive or mixed-
motive discrimination claims and continue to apply the
McDonnell Douglas framework to all such claims.' Other states
apply the Price Waterhouse framework to all mixed claims,
whether based on direct or circumstantial evidence.' Still other
courts maintain that application of McDonnell Douglas is
appropriate to mixed-motive claims with circumstantial evidence,
and the Price Waterhouse framework should be applied to mixed-
motive claims based on direct evidence." 7 Some states appear
123. Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying
mixed-motive analysis to FMLA claims); Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311-12 (5th Cir. 2004)
(applying the mixed-motive analysis to ADEA claims).
124. See, e.g., Dare, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (explaining that Minnesota did not amend
its state statute to reflect amendments made to Title VII); see also Plagmann v. Square D
Co., 695 N.W.2d 333 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion) (indicating that Desert
Palace analysis might not apply to state civil rights claim because Iowa's Civil Rights Act
does not contain language identical to Title VII's 1991 amendment).
125. Beckman v. KGP Telecomm., Inc., No. 02-1261 (JNEJGL), 2004 WL 533943, at
*4 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2004) (applying McDonnell Douglas to Minnesota state law claims);
Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 624, 626-27 (Minn. 1988);
see also Smidt v. Porter, 695 N.W.2d 9, 14 n.1 (Iowa 2005) (noting that neither party
challenged the application of McDonnell Douglas after Desert Palace, and so the court
would apply the McDonnell Douglas standard). But see Brekke v. City of Blackduck, 984
F. Supp. 1209, 1222 & n.17 (D. Minn. 1997) (noting the distinction between state and
federal application of McDonnell Douglas); Brenden v. Westonka Pub. Sch., No. EM03-
017571, 2005 WL 1936195, at *8 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 10, 2005) (applying Desert Palace
as an affirmative defense).
126. Jung v. George Washington Univ., 875 A.2d 95, 111 (D.C. 2005); Newberne v.
Dep't. of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 618 S.E.2d 201, 208 (N.C. 2005) (applying
framework to claims under state whistleblower statutes).
127. See, e.g., Nash v. Blood & Tissue Ctr. of Cent. Tex., No. 03-03-00763-CV, 2004
WL 2900483, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 16, 2004, no pet.) (noting that nothing in the
record indicated that the trial court applied the wrong standard and refusing to decide
which is the correct test to apply because the same result would be reached under any
articulation).
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inclined to interpret their state discrimination statutes as
incorporating the Desert Palace standard.128 Some states that
have considered questions about the intersection of McDonnell
Douglas, Price Waterhouse, and Desert Palace have refused to
resolve the dilemma by simply indicating that the same party
would prevail no matter what test was used.'29
Despite the diversity that exists among state outcomes,
federal courts considering similar issues under state law often
simply reiterate that the state court looks to federal law to
determine the particular issue and then assumes the state would
apply the same standard. ° This oversimplification is problematic
because it ignores the role that states should play in resolving
the important substantive questions that underlie the debate,
including (1) whether differences between circumstantial and
direct evidence require different standards; (2) whether mixed-
motive claims exist under state law; and (3) how and whether
single-motive discrimination claims are different than mixed-
motive claims.
Given the diversity of opinions about how the issues relating
to McDonnell Douglas, Price Waterhouse, Desert Palace, and the
1991 amendments should be resolved, it is not appropriate for
federal courts considering these issues to assume that a
particular state will simply follow the federal courts' lead. Under
our modern notions of federalism, federal courts considering
these state claims have an obligation to consider how the state
court would rule on these issues and not simply to take the
analytic shortcut of assuming such agreement exists.
3. Examining the Use of McDonnell Douglas in Jury
Instructions. The federal circuit courts are currently in disarray
as to whether McDonnell Douglas should be incorporated in jury
instructions.' Most circuits have held that McDonnell Douglas
128. Myers v. AT&T Corp., 882 A.2d 961, 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(concluding that Desert Palace analysis should not be limited to Title VII cases alone).
129. See id. at 972 (finding evidence sufficient under both Desert Palace and Price
Waterhouse formulations); DeLeon v. Iowa Select Farms, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa App.
2005) (unpublished opinion) (affirming the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs
evidence was insufficient under both Desert Palace and Price Waterhouse formulations).
130. See, e.g., Harris v. Giant Eagle Inc., 133 F. App'x 288, 292 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005)
(noting that same framework applied to state and federal claims).
131. Compare Williams v. Eau Claire Pub. Schs., 397 F.3d 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework may, but need not, be incorporated into
jury instructions), with Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfg., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 58
(1st Cir. 2005) (noting that district court instructed the jury to evaluate the evidence by
applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework); see also Kozlowski v.
Hampton Sch. Bd., 77 F. App'x 133, 141 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing use of McDonnell
Douglas framework in jury instructions).
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should not be used in jury instructions, 32 while a minority of
circuits allow juries to be instructed using the McDonnell
Douglas framework.3 3 Despite the growing consensus in favor of
excluding McDonnell Douglas from federal jury instructions,
many states continue to require that juries be instructed using
McDonnell Douglas's three-part, burden-shifting framework.'
However, like the majority of federal courts, some states indicate
that juries should not be instructed on the framework.'3 1
Important procedural and substantive concerns underlie the
courts' disagreements about whether McDonnell Douglas should
be incorporated into jury instructions. Some courts believe that
any discussion of the three-part, burden-shifting test in jury
instructions would be so confusing that the jury may not be able
to render a verdict based on such instructions. 36 Other circuits
eliminate McDonnell Douglas from jury instructions not only
because of its tendency to be confusing, but also because the
courts believe that McDonnell Douglas and its related
132. Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2005);
Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2004); Sanders v. N.Y.
City Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 2004); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont,
328 F.3d 532, 539-40 (9th Cir. 2003); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317,
1322 (l1th Cir. 1999); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 849-50 (8th Cir. 1997) (en bane)
(Loken, J., dissenting (Part II.A of dissent, which a majority of the court joined)); Gehring
v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994). But see Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
207 F.3d 207, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2000) (indicating that it is proper to instruct the jury that it
may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to establish the prima facie case
have been shown, but noting that it is error to instruct as to the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting scheme).
133. Rodriguez-Torres, 399 F.3d at 58 (finding that the district court instructed the
jury to evaluate the evidence by applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework); Kozlowski, 77 F. App'x at 139-40, 142 (finding that specific instructions were
given incorrectly, but not taking issue with practice of giving jury McDonnell Douglas
instructions); Brown v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 338 F.3d 586, 595-96 (6th Cir. 2003)
(approving the use of McDonnell Douglas in jury instructions). But see Mullen v. Princess
Anne Vol. Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the "shifting burdens
of production of Burdine ... are beyond the function and expertise of the jury" and are
"overly complex"). Even some circuits that do not generally countenance the use of the
standard will find that it is harmless error for such instructions to be given. Sanders, 361
F.3d at 758-59 (finding it was harmless error for district court to instruct jury as to
burden-shifting framework); Vincini v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Co., 41 F. App'x 512, 514 (2d Cir.
2002); Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1322. The Third Circuit allows the court to instruct the jury
regarding the factual predicates underlying McDonnell Douglas, but not on the burden of
articulation that shifts to the defendant. See Watson, 207 F.3d at 221.
134. See, e.g., Padilla v. Berkeley Educ. Serv. of N.J., 891 A.2d 616, 621 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (indicating that jury is required to consider McDonnell Douglas when
deliberating over claims under New Jersey antidiscrimination statute).
135. See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Brite, 161 S.W.3d 566, 578 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 215 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2007); Wong v. City of
Cambridge, No. 2001-2737-C, 2003 WL 1542117, at *3 (Mass. Super. Feb. 21, 2003).
136. See, e.g., Kanida, 363 F.3d at 576; Sanders, 361 F.3d at 758; see also Sanghvi,
328 F.3d at 540-41; Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1322.
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presumptions no longer apply at the trial stage. In these circuits,
the "presumptions and burdens inherent in the McDonnell
Douglas formulation drop out of consideration when the case is
submitted to the jury."137
Regarding state law discrimination claims, state courts
should play a role in answering questions about whether
McDonnell Douglas and its burden-shifting scheme are even
applicable at the trial stage. To ignore legitimate state concerns
about the function of McDonnell Douglas would allow the federal
courts to provide different jury instructions from the state courts
on state law claims. As discussed below, such an outcome raises
serious vertical choice of law concerns.
As these three examples demonstrate, there are important
questions about McDonnell Douglas and its proper place in
employment discrimination law being decided by both state and
federal courts. Federal courts that ignore the developing case law
and fail to recognize that the term "McDonnell Douglas" does not
refer to a monolithic standard risk overlooking important state
law concerns and applying an improper standard to state
discrimination claims.
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS AND VERTICAL
CHOICE OF LAW
While many federal courts have simply ignored the role that
state courts can and should play in developing employment law,
other courts have tried to quash the states' role by declaring that
federal courts sitting in diversity are required to apply that
court's version of McDonnell Douglas to both federal and state
claims. This Part explores how some federal courts are using
vertical choice of law principles to improperly supplant the
development of state law.
A brief overview of the Supreme Court's pronouncements
regarding vertical choice of law is followed by a discussion of
Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,13 the
leading circuit court case finding that federal courts are required
to use McDonnell Douglas in examining state law claims. This
examination establishes that the McDonnell Douglas rule is
clearly substantive in a vertical choice of law context and should
yield to state standards when a conflict exists. Before proceeding
137. Whittington, 429 F.3d at 998 (quoting Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903
F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990)); Sanghvi, 328 F.3d at 537; Gehring, 43 F.3d at 343
(indicating that McDonnell Douglas is only for use in pretrial proceedings).
138. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2001).
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to an in-depth analysis of this question, it is important to
examine the flaws in the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Snead,
which demonstrate common misconceptions that courts have
regarding vertical choice of law analysis. A thorough discussion
of the errors in this case is instructive in showing why other
federal courts should reject its holding and instead apply a state
standard to state discrimination claims.
A. The Three-Tiered Approach to Vertical Choice of Law
The era of modern vertical choice of law began in 1938. Prior
to that time, federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
followed the doctrine announced in Swift v. Tyson and were not
required to defer to a state's common law.'39 The Swift decision,
founded on a natural law approach to judicial interpretation, was
based on the beliefs that federal judges were just as skilled at
discovering the law as their state counterparts and that such a
rule would lead to a uniform body of law. 40
In 1938, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Erie v.
Tompkins, completely changing vertical choice of law and its
underlying policy.' Under the Erie doctrine, "federal diversity
jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the adjudication of
state-created rights, but it does not carry with it generation of
rules of substantive law.""2 Therefore, according to the rule
announced in Erie, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction
must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits,
including that state's choice of law rules.' However, the federal
court could still apply its own procedural rules.'" Since Erie, a
positivist view of choice of law issues has predominated, where
vertical choice of law issues are largely driven by concerns about
federalism and practicality.
14 5
139. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 9 (1842).
140. Robert J. Condlin, "A Formstone of Our Federalism": The Erie/Hanna Doctrine
& Casebook Law Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (2005).
141. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
142. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996); see also Erie,
304 U.S. at 78.
143. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 ("The conflict of laws rules to
be applied by the federal court in [a district] must conform to those prevailing in [that
district's] state courts.").
144. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
145. A comprehensive discussion of vertical choice of law issues is outside the scope
of this Article. This Part is merely designed to provide a reader with a basic
understanding of vertical choice of law issues. For a broader discussion of these issues,
see generally Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective
Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1999); Condlin, supra note 140;
John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693 (1974); J. Benjamin
2007] 379
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
After Erie, the dichotomy between procedural and
substantive rules remained unclear, and both the courts and
commentators began to question whether use of this terminology
was helpful in the vertical choice of law context.46 These terms
remain helpful if we think of vertical choice of law inquiries in
the context of a two-circle Venn diagram. In one circle of the
Venn diagram are issues labeled as substantive. In the other
circle are issues labeled as procedural.
Some substantive issues clearly do not overlap into the
realm of procedure. For example, the term "substantive" clearly
describes the elements of a claim, for which the federal courts
sitting in diversity will always apply state law. Likewise, some
procedural issues are distinct from substantive issues. For
example, it is almost always the case that rules provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be held to be procedural.
Indeed, under the Supreme Court's decision in Hanna v. Plumer,
if a court is faced with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that is
validly enacted under Rules Enabling Act,"' a federal court
sitting in diversity will apply the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure,
regardless of contrary state procedural law.'48
Although relying on the monikers of "substantive" and
"procedural" may be helpful in resolving many vertical choice of
law questions, they do not answer the question of which law the
court will use when a conflict arises between a federal, judge-
made procedural rule and a state law or state rule. Arguably,
these rules often have features that can be described as both
procedural and substantive, and thus fall within the overlapping
portions of the Venn diagram. The Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc.'49 Although
not a model of clarity,5 ° the Gasperini case appears to establish
the following framework for courts to use when trying to
determine whether to apply a state procedural rule or a federal
King, Clarification and Disruption: The Effect of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161 (1997); Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Resolving
Separation of Powers and Federalism Problems Raised by Erie, the Rules of Decision Act,
and the Rules Enabling Act: A Proposed Solution, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 519 (2004).
146. Cf Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 ("Classification of a law as 'substantive' or
'procedural' for Erie purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor."); Condlin, supra note
140, at 492 ("[Tlhe substance/procedure distinction is a famously difficult one to make
operational . .. ").
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
148. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965).
149. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426.
150. Condlin, supra note 140, at 525 (describing Gasperini as "confusing and
strangely organized").
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judge-made procedural rule in a diversity case.' Some
commentators have referred to these types of cases as ones
involving an "unguided Erie choice. " "'
One inquiry the court will consider is whether the
procedural rule is outcome determinative, in the sense that it
would cause forum shopping or result in an inequitable
administration of justice.'53 In other words, will applying the
state standard "'have so important an effect upon the fortunes of
one or both of the litigants that failure to [apply] it would
[unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or] be
likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court"'?' The
Gasperini court was also concerned about whether the state
procedural law at issue was manifestly substantive.' If the
underlying policy of the procedural rule is intertwined with
substantive policy objectives, then the federal court should give
consideration to applying the state procedural rule.
However, Gasperini does not instruct federal courts sitting
in diversity to apply the state procedural rule in all instances
where the state procedural rule is outcome determinative or was
enacted for substantive reasons. Rather, Gasperini creates a
balancing test. If a state rule is outcome determinative or
appears to have been adopted largely for substantive reasons, the
federal court sitting in diversity will apply the state procedural
rule unless the federal court determines that significant federal
interests outweigh the state interests at stake."6 When a
significant federal interest does outweigh the state interest, the
Court will either apply the federal procedural rule or try to find a
way to accommodate both the state and federal interests.5 7
As indicated earlier, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
indicated that the McDonnell Douglas test is a procedural,
151. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426-32. The Author is not suggesting that the Gasperini
case will be the Supreme Court's last word on vertical choice of law issues related to
judge-made procedural rules, merely that it is the Court's most recent and, therefore, the
currently binding pronouncement. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 140, at 532 (questioning
whether Gasperini will be fine-tuned or substantially re-directed by future courts and
arguing that the case is "seriously confused").
152. King, supra note 145, at 163.
153. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428.
154. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9
(1965)).
155. Id. at 429-31.
156. See id. at 431-32 (describing that federal interests may outweigh the state's
interest in applying the state rule).
157. See id. (holding that the federal trial court should apply the state standard for
determining when a verdict is excessive).
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evidentiary standard. 158 However, as this discussion highlights,
labeling an issue as substantive or procedural does not aid a
vertical choice of law inquiry in all instances. Indeed, the Court
has repeatedly warned that characterizations of a rule as
procedural or substantive in one context may not carry over into
other contexts.159 The failure to recognize that different contexts
will change whether an issue is characterized as substantive or
procedural has resulted in a large stumbling block in vertical
choice of law determinations relating to McDonnell Douglas.
B. Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co.
There are few cases that discuss the interaction of
McDonnell Douglas and vertical choice of law issues with any
specificity.6 ° Unfortunately, the one reported circuit court case
that considers the interaction in detail did not conduct a full
Gasperini analysis and failed to recognize that the Supreme
Court's descriptions of McDonnell Douglas as procedural were
not binding in the vertical choice of law context.
In Snead v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance
Co.,161 the Ninth Circuit considered whether it would be
appropriate to apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to a
disability discrimination claim brought pursuant to Oregon's
disability discrimination law.6 ' The plaintiff originally filed her
claims under the state statute in Oregon state court, and her
claims were later removed to federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. 163
Under Oregon law, the federal court held that a defendant's
motion for summary judgment should be denied as long as
plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination.6 4 In
other words, under Oregon law, the second and third steps of the
McDonnell Douglas case are not considered at the summary
158. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514 (1993); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 577 (1978); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (holding
that McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard and not a pleading requirement).
159. See, e.g., Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397
(1949) (finding that "'[slubstance' and 'procedure'... are not legal concepts of invariant
content").
160. But see Crout v. Barber-Colman Co., No. 93 C 20122, 1996 WL 304530, at *8
(N.D. Ill. May 30, 1996) (explaining that the federal McDonnell Douglas standard can be
used to evaluate state retaliatory discharge cases and describing McDonnell Douglas as
procedural).
161. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2001).
162. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.112 (2005); Snead, 237 F.3d at 1089-93.
163. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1087.
164. See id. at 1090.
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judgment stage. Even if a defendant articulates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct during the summary
judgment proceedings, the plaintiff is not required to rebut this
evidence to survive summary judgment. The plaintiff argued that
the federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction was required to
apply the state standard, while the defendant argued that
McDonnell Douglas was procedural and should be applied.'65
The Ninth Circuit indicated that it was proceeding under the
assumption that the question before it was a Gasperini problem
involving judge-made rules. 66 It then noted that "classification of
a law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' for Erie purposes is
sometimes a challenging endeavor." 7 The Ninth Circuit then
described a two-part test for determining whether the federal
rule or state rule should prevail.'68 The court indicated that the
first inquiry should be whether the state rule was outcome
determinative in the sense that it would result in forum shopping
by parties or the inequitable administration of justice.'69 Second,
[ilf the state law is indeed outcome determinative... we then
must decide whether an overriding federal interest justifies
application of federal law."7 ° Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not
address whether the Oregon rule was tied to substantive, rather
than merely procedural, objectives.
In examining the first question, the Ninth Circuit held that
the Oregon rule is not outcome determinative."' The court based
its holding on the following analysis:
The only significant difference between the state and
federal regimes is when a case that fails one of the
McDonnell Douglas components will be dismissed. For
example, a plaintiff whose case could not survive summary
judgment on the third McDonnell Douglas component in
federal court for lack of evidence would only delay the
inevitable by proceeding in state court where, on the same
record, a nonsuit or JNOV would be in order at the close of
the plaintiffs case. In either case, the court would
ultimately apply the same substantive law, employ the
same reasoning, and produce the same result. Only the
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)).
168. Id. at 1090-91.
169. See id. at 1090.
170. Id. at 1091.
171. Id.
2007] 383
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
timing of the case's dismissal (along with the added expense
of bringing the case to trial) would differ.'7 2
The Ninth Circuit did little additional analysis, and simply
declared that neither of Erie's twin aims would be implicated
because "no significant advantage would ultimately be gained by
filing in state, as opposed to federal court."'73
The Ninth Circuit then continued by finding that there was
an overriding federal interest at stake.'7 4 The court identified the
interest by providing that if the federal courts were required to
follow the Oregon rule, "nearly every case of employment
discrimination filed under Oregon law would go to trial,
providing an increased burden on the district courts' already
crowded trial dockets."175 The court then threw in a paragraph
about how questions regarding the allocation of decisions to be
made between the judges and juries in the federal system are
important.
76
In a separate section, the court analyzed what it called
"other considerations" that supported its analysis.'77 The first of
these considerations was the Supreme Court's pronouncement
that McDonnell Douglas was procedural.178 The court also
indicated that its "conclusion is also consistent with circuit law
on the application of federal summary judgment procedures in
diversity cases.
Judge Donald Lay dissented from the panel decision on this
issue but provided little helpful discussion regarding the
underlying issues. Judge Lay simply indicated that "Erie... both
teach[es] us that we simply exchange courtrooms, not law, in
deciding diversity cases" and that there was no federal policy
that should override Oregon law in this instance.8
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1091-92.
175. Id. at 1092.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1093.
180. Id. at 1095 (Lay, J., dissenting). The dearth of discussion may be explained by
Judge Lay's belief that, even if application of federal law were appropriate, the McDonnell
Douglas standard should not be applied to the disability discrimination issue before the
court. Id. at 1095-96; see also Morgan v. New Horizon Commc'n, No. CV 03-851-HA, 2005
WL 326966, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2005) (applying Snead); Thomson v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., No. CV-03-1350-ST, 2004 WL 2584022, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2004) (same); Jamal
v. Wilshire Mgmt. Leasing Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1075 (D. Or. 2004) (noting that
while McDonnell Douglas framework did not apply in diversity cases, it still was
appropriate in cases arising under ADEA).
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C. Learning from Vertical Choice of Law Characterization
Mistakes
An in-depth exploration of the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Snead demonstrates five crucial mistakes the court made when
considering whether vertical choice of law required the
application of a federal version of the McDonnell Douglas
standard. First, the court erred by characterizing this case as an
unguided Erie problem, rather than a substantive issue governed
by the Erie doctrine itself. However, even if we assume that the
Ninth Circuit characterized the problem correctly, it failed to
properly analyze the issue under the current principles
underlying unguided Erie choices (1) by engaging in a truncated
explanation of the Gasperini test, (2) by failing to fully consider
the issue of outcome determinativeness, (3) by improperly
overvaluing the federal interests at stake, and (4) by taking into
account additional considerations that do not play a role in the
vertical choice of law analysis.
1. Considering Whether an Unguided Erie Choice Is
Necessary. In making determinations about vertical choice of law,
the first task a court must undertake is to determine how the
problem should be characterized. When determining whether to
apply a federal version of McDonnell Douglas to state law claims,
two of the potential vertical choice of law frameworks may be
applicable. First, as discussed above, a court may understand a
problem as involving purely substantive issues and simply apply
the holding in Erie that federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction must apply state law. If the court rejects the question
as falling clearly within the dictates of Erie, it may categorize the
issue as one involving the unguided Erie choice described in the
Gasperini case.
There is a strong argument that at least portions of the
McDonnell Douglas framework call for a strict application of
Erie. It is true that McDonnell Douglas and its state
counterparts play a procedural role in that they establish the
order in which the court will consider the parties' evidence.'81
However, it is not usually this portion of the test that litigants
argue in relation to vertical choice of law issues.
Rather, litigants are typically litigating three other parts of
the McDonnell Douglas framework that are overwhelmingly
substantive. First, the federal test and its state counterparts
indicate that parties must set forth certain facts to establish a
181. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793-94 (1973).
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presumption of discrimination and what facts are necessary for
the defendant to rebut that presumption.'82 Second, once the
required facts are established, the McDonnell Douglas test
determines that a rebuttable inference of discrimination arises. 183
Third, the McDonnell Douglas test and its state counterparts
direct each party as to the burden of production or persuasion
that each party bears during each step of the analysis."M
Given these three factors, whether to apply McDonnell
Douglas or a state counterpart appears to fall directly within the
contours of the Supreme Court's decision in Dick v. New York
Life Insurance Co.' 5 That case revolved around whether an
insurance company was required to pay double indemnity on a
life insurance policy when the insurance company believed that
the insured had committed suicide.'86
The facts of the case are straightforward. A farmer was
found dead in his barn with two gunshot wounds, one to his torso
and the other to his head.'87 At trial, there was evidence that the
farmer was healthy, happily married, and in good financial
condition; in other words, he had no motive to commit suicide.'88
Evidence also was presented that the farmer's gun was old and
that it discharged occasionally on accident.'89 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the farmer's widow, and the trial court denied
the insurance company's motions for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial.9 ° The court of appeals ruled that
the district court erred in denying the judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, finding that there was no version of the facts that
supported an accidental death and that the death was a
suicide.' The farmer's widow then appealed the case to the
Supreme Court.
Both of the parties assumed that North Dakota law applied
to the case.'92 And, although the Supreme Court noted that
questions lurked within the case regarding whether state or
federal sufficiency of the evidence standards prevailed,'93 the
182. Id. at 802-04.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
186. Id. at 438.
187. Id. at 441.
188. Id. at 446.
189. Id. at 441-42.
190. Id. at 442.
191. Id. at 444.
192. Id. at 442.
193. Id. at 444-45.
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Court's discussion of the remaining, uncontested choice of law
issues suggested that the parties' assumption was consistent
with federal law. The Court noted that under North Dakota law,
there was a presumption that a death was accidental and that
the insurance company was required to overcome that
presumption.'94 In applying the North Dakota rule, the Court
indicated that "[u]nder the Erie rule, presumptions (and their
effects) and burden of proof are 'substantive' and hence
respondent was required to shoulder the burden during the
instant trial."'95
Other courts have likewise assumed or decided that in a
diversity case state law would govern the existence of a
presumption and the evidence required to obtain the
presumption.'96 Likewise, burdens of persuasion and production
are nearly universally classified as substantive for Erie
purposes. 197 Even within the McDonnell Douglas context, courts
have characterized the question before them as involving a
straightforward Erie issue, and not an unguided Erie choice.9
The Snead opinion failed to consider the possibility that the issue
before it may have involved a simple application of Erie. Had it
characterized the problem before it as involving a simple Erie
choice, it would have reached the opposite conclusion.
Skipping the initial characterization issue, the Ninth Circuit
assumed that the question before it involved an unguided Erie
choice. It then began to apply the test announced in Gasperini to
the problem before it.' 99 However, it is unclear from the court's
reasoning whether it properly applied the Gasperini test.
As discussed earlier, the Gasperini test is not a model of
clarity, but commentators and courts (including the Ninth
Circuit) have indicated that the test requires consideration of
194. Id. at 442-43.
195. Id. at 446.
196. See Johnston v. Pierce Packing Co., 550 F.2d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 1977) (indicating
that parties agreed that Idaho law should govern question of whether plaintiff was
entitled to a presumption that he was exercising due care); Dodson v. Imperial Motors,
Inc., 295 F.2d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 1961) (holding that state presumption regarding validity
of a document signed by a notary should be used); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F.
Supp. 1368, 1377 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that New York law created in effect a
presumption that ambiguous clauses in insurance policies were construed in favor of the
insured).
197. DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1200 (3d Cir. 1978)
(indicating that burdens of proof are typically considered substantive for Erie purposes);
see also Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., 29 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1994) (same for burdens
of persuasion).
198. See Sandbank v. Kodak Elec. Printing Sys., Inc., No. 96-1342, 1997 WL 595087
(6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1997).
199. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090-93 (9th Cir. 2001).
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both outcome determinativeness and whether an arguably
procedural rule is bound up with substantive concerns.2° Courts
should consider whether the state law is "merely a form and
mode of enforcing the [right]" or whether it is "a rule intended to
be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of
the parties."20 1 If the rule is merely procedural, the analysis
weighs in favor of applying federal law. If the rule has
substantive underpinnings, then the calculus shifts in favor of
applying the state law.
Several portions of the McDonnell Douglas test are clearly
substantive in nature. First, McDonnell Douglas sets forth
burdens of production and persuasion for both parties.2  The
plaintiff is required to provide sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case. If the plaintiff is successful in doing this, the
defendant must merely articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions (a burden of
production).2 ' °  Likewise, state counterparts to McDonnell
Douglas set forth similar burdens of persuasion and production.
These burdens are almost always classified as substantive for
Erie purposes .25
Additionally, the federal test and its state counterparts
establish the material facts that the plaintiff will need to
demonstrate to obtain the presumption, and the ones the
defendant will need to articulate to rebut it.2"6 As discussed
above, the test also tells us what presumption results from the
establishment of the prima facie case-a rebuttable presumption
that discrimination is a likely cause of the employment action.
200. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1996); In re
Larry's Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A] federal court sitting in
diversity applies state law in deciding whether to allow attorney's fees when those fees
are connected to the substance of the case." (quoting Price v. Seydell, 961 F.2d 1470, 1475
(9th Cir. 1992))); United States ex rel. Newshan v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190
F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999).
201. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
202. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
203. Id. at 802 (stating that a plaintiff may establish discrimination "by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications").
204. Id. at 802-03.
205. See DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1200 (3d Cir. 1978)
(indicating that burdens of proof are typically considered substantive for Erie purposes);
see also Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., 29 F.3d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1994) (same for burdens
of persuasion).
206. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
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All of these portions of McDonnell Douglas are tied up with
substantive, and not merely procedural, interests.
The Ninth Circuit did not address whether the Oregon rule
was tied to substantive, rather than merely procedural,
objectives. As discussed earlier, had the court conducted this
analysis, it would have determined that the rule is tied to
substantive policy decisions. Given the inherent ambiguities in
the Gasperini test and its subsequent interpretations, it does not
make sense to dwell upon or to too heavily emphasize this
omission in the court's analysis. However, it is noted to
demonstrate the lack of care undertaken in reaching the
conclusion that federal law should apply.
2. An Unsatisfactory Examination of Outcome
Determinativeness. The Ninth Circuit also engaged in a cursory
analysis regarding whether use of the state McDonnell Douglas
framework would be outcome determinative. Before plunging
into a discussion about whether the McDonnell Douglas
framework is outcome determinative, it is first necessary to
define the term "outcome determinative," as the meaning of this
term has changed since its original inception in choice of law
jurisprudence.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,0 7 the Supreme Court
considered whether a federal court sitting in diversity was
required to follow a state statute of limitations or whether the
court could apply the equitable doctrine of laches. °' In
determining that the lower courts were required to follow the
state statute of limitations, the Court indicated that the state
statute of limitations should be followed because it was outcome
determinative."9 As the Court stated: "[In all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the
diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same,
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it
would be if tried in a State court."210 Using York, the term
"outcome determinative" was read to mean that if application of a
state rule would lead to a dismissal and application of a federal
rule would not (or vice versa), then the state rule was "outcome
determinative" and should be applied in the Erie context.2 1
207. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
208. Id. at 107.
209. Id. at 110.
210. Id. at 109.
211. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466 (1965) (noting that counsel had
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However, as most civil procedure students know, this definition
proved unworkable because almost all rules that parties are
vigorously disputing can be outcome determinative when viewed
from the ex post perspective.
In the case of Hanna v. Plumer, the Supreme Court
appeared to modify the York definition of outcome
determinativeness, at least in dicta.1  The Court first noted that
a definition of outcome determinativeness that only looked at
whether the outcome of the case was affected would prove
unworkable because "in this sense every procedural variation is
'outcome-determinative."'213 In rejecting this interpretation of the
term, the Hanna court appeared to change the perspective from
which outcome determinativeness should be viewed. Rather than
asking about the ex post consequences of the term, the Hanna
court instructed that outcome determinativeness be considered
from an ex ante perspective. As the Court indicated: "The
'outcome-determination' test therefore cannot be read without
reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws." "
Thus, the primary focus of outcome determinativeness post-
Hanna is whether the type of rule in question is one that would
lead to forum shopping by the parties or the inequitable
administration of justice.215 The Ninth Circuit indicated that it
was using this definition of outcome determinativeness when
deciding the Snead case.2 "6 The Ninth Circuit indicated that
"[tihe only significant difference between the state and federal
regimes is when a case that fails one of the McDonnell Douglas
components will be dismissed."27 Thus, the Ninth Circuit posited
that because it would be appropriate to dismiss the case under
the Oregon standard upon a directed verdict at the close of
plaintiffs case, the application of the federal McDonnell Douglas
standard (which would dismiss the case at summary judgment)
argued that the state law must be applied in any instance where it would affect the
outcome of the case); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 181, 197
(2004) (discussing meaning of outcome determinativeness).
212. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-70. I characterize Hanna's modification of Erie as dicta
because the Court did not base its holding on whether the state and federal rules were
outcome determinative.
213. Id. at 468.
214. Id.
215. Id. As Larry Solum has indicated, this articulation of outcome
determinativeness is not wholly satisfactory in striking a line between procedural and
substantive rules. Solum, supra note 211, at 201-04.
216. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001).
217. Id. at 1091.
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would not lead to forum shopping.21 Stated another way, the
court reasoned that a plaintiff's lawyer would not choose a forum
simply because it would wait to dismiss the case at trial, rather
than at the earlier summary judgment stage.
However, the Ninth Circuit's analysis appears to
misunderstand its own interpretation of Oregon law. One of the
cases cited by the Ninth Circuit indicates that "[a] plaintiffs
prima facie case does not disappear merely because a defendant
asserts a nondiscriminatory reason which may or may not
persuade the trier of fact."219 Thus, it appears that under Oregon
law (as articulated by the Ninth Circuit),22 ° if a plaintiff proves a
prima facie case of discrimination, and the defendant offers a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the
defendant's burden is not merely one of articulation. Rather, the
defendant must actually prove the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for taking its action, and the jury is free to believe or
reject that reason based on the evidence. Contrary to the Ninth
Circuit's holding, a directed verdict would not be appropriate at
the close of plaintiffs case simply because the defendant
articulated a reason for its conduct, even if the plaintiff
presented no evidence of pretext. This is true because the jury
could simply choose not to believe the defendant's articulation of
its reason, and the plaintiffs prima facie case, and the inferences
it created, would remain.
Even outside of the specific context of Snead, it is important
to understand the ways in which application of a federal version
of McDonnell Douglas (rather than a different state rule) would
lead to forum shopping and the inequitable administration of
justice.221 In making this inquiry, it is important to remember
218. Id.
219. Henderson v. Jantzen, Inc., 719 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
220. There is some dispute regarding whether the Ninth Circuit properly interpreted
the use of McDonnell Douglas under Oregon law. Brief for Appellant at 21-22, Snead v.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080 (1999) (No. 99-35071). This Article does not
comment on the propriety of the court's decision in that regard, only that the court
appears to contradict its own tuderstanding of Oregon law.
221. It is unclear whether plaintiffs' attorneys are motivated by the same factors in
forum selection that would be outcome determinative under the modified outcome-
determinative test. One study found that "the outcome-determinative factors relating to
judicial qualities and local bias were the strongest forces in defense attorneys' forum
selection decisions. Among plaintiff attorneys, by contrast, most important were attorney
convenience and the pace and cost of litigation, factors that are not outcome
determinative." Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases
Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 400 (1992).
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that "[a] difference is significant if it induces litigants with a
choice of forums to pick one over the other."
22
Using this definition, McDonnell Douglas can be outcome
determinative in three different ways. First, McDonnell Douglas
places burdens of persuasion and burdens of production on the
parties. A plaintiff determining which forum to proceed in would
choose a forum that placed lower burdens of persuasion or
production on the plaintiff or higher burdens of persuasion or
production on the other party.223
Second, the McDonnell Douglas framework creates and
destroys presumptions as the parties litigate through the
framework. The outcome determinativeness of McDonnell
Douglas can easily be seen in reference to these inferences and
the two standards at issue in the Snead case. Under McDonnell
Douglas, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, an inference of discrimination is created. That
inference is destroyed if the defendant articulates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. In Snead, the Oregon
standard did not allow the defendant to rebut the inference
created by the prima facie case at the summary judgment
stage.
224
Third, at summary judgment, McDonnell Douglas and its
companion state standards provide litigants with a list of the
facts that are material in establishing discrimination. In other
words, both the federal McDonnell Douglas standard and the
similar state court standards are a proxy for the following
statement: These facts are material to determining whether
there is evidence of discrimination. Some states have weighed
that decision differently and determined that fewer facts are
material in the calculation of whether discrimination is
present.22s The materiality of a fact within the summary
judgment analysis is outcome determinative.226
222. Fauber v. KEM Transp. & Equip. Co., 876 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1989).
223. See, e.g., Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of Puerto Rico Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17,
29 n.9 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that "[tihe difference between the burdens of proof placed
upon plaintiffs and defendants... can be outcome determinative"); Lewis v. Heckler, 808
F.2d 1293, 1298 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that the "allocation of the burden of proof could be
outcome determinative"); Carvalho v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 794 F.2d 454, 455 (9th
Cir. 1986) (noting that "placing the burden of proof on the wrong party in a civil action
generally constitutes reversible error").
224. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001).
225. See generally supra Part III (discussing the lack of consensus among the
different approaches to McDonnell Douglas taken by various courts).
226. West v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 868 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1989)
(determining whether a reasonable jury could find for plaintiff by looking at actions that
were allowed under state law); Steven Alan Childress, Judicial Review and Diversity
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By denying the substantive differences between the state
and federal McDonnell Douglas standards, the Ninth Circuit in
Snead ignored the fact that certain portions of the test are
considered to be outcome determinative. This omission denied
the court the opportunity to properly conduct the weighing of
state and federal interests required under vertical choice of law
analysis. In essence, the Ninth Circuit held that the state had no
interest in having its standard apply.
3. A Strange Articulation of the Federal Interest at Stake.
The Ninth Circuit's Gasperini analysis relies heavily on the
court's articulation of an overriding federal interest that
prohibits the application of state law. The federal interest
expressed by the Ninth Circuit is surprising. Essentially, the
panel admits that McDonnell Douglas serves a docket-clearing
function for the court, allowing the court to get rid of cases at the
summary judgment stage, rather than allowing them to proceed
to trial.227
Recognizing that a docket-clearing function is probably not
an overriding federal interest, the Ninth Circuit then tries to
justify the federal interest as one involving questions regarding
the allocation of burdens between the judge and the jury.228
However, this articulation of the federal interest misunderstands
the issue before the court. No one in Snead argued that the court
was not entitled to rule on summary judgment using Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, only that in using the federal
standard, the court was required to rely on state rules about
what was material to that determination and to use state
guidance with regard to burdens of production and persuasion,
and their effects. 29
Thus, it appears that the Ninth Circuit conflated what
should have been two distinct inquiries: who should evaluate the
evidence and what the state law defined as the proper evidence
to evaluate.23 ° This conflation is not uncommon when trying to
characterize an issue as procedural or substantive for purposes of
vertical choice of law analysis. As one commentator noted:
Jurisdiction: Solving an Irrepressible Erie Mystery?, 47 SMU L. REV. 271, 280 (1994).
227. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1092 ("If federal courts sitting in diversity were compelled to
follow [Oregon summary judgment law], nearly every case of employment discrimination
filed under Oregon law would go to trial, providing an increased burden on the district
courts' already crowded trial dockets.").
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1090-91.
230. Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., 29 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing the
distinction between these two inquiries).
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Some of the inconsistency in the cases and commentators,
then, may stem from failing to carefully distinguish similar-
sounding review issues from true sufficiency review.
Burdens and presumptions are part of the substantive
package in a way that is simply not shared by the review
test itself, even to the extent the test necessarily includes
application of trial burdens and presumptions as part of the
substantive law reviewed.23 ,
In failing to make this distinction, the Ninth Circuit
asserted a weighty federal interest into its analysis where none
existed. The federal courts had no interest in determining what
facts were material to summary judgment on a state law
discrimination claim, what presumptions would arise from those
facts, or what standards are necessary for creating those
presumptions.
4. Errors in the "Other Considerations." After conducting
its Gasperini analysis, the Ninth Circuit indicated that "other
considerations" supported its decision. It is notable that none of
these "other considerations" play a proper role in the Gasperini
analysis. However, even if we were to consider them as only
persuasive authority in support of the court's analysis, they do
not carry much persuasive value.
The first "other consideration" that the Ninth Circuit relied
on was the fact that the Supreme Court had indicated that
McDonnell Douglas was procedural in two cases, St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks232 and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc.233 The Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court's characterization of the test as procedural was "probative
of the Court's view [of the] subject."23 4 While it is true that both of
those cases indicated the burden-shifting framework was
procedural, neither of these cases was a diversity case. '35 And,
231. Childress, supra note 226, at 280, 320 ("[To the extent burdens and standards
of proof are now considered within the application of the federal summary judgment
analysis, those burdens are likely found in state substantive law for that cause of
action.").
232. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993) (holding that the trier
of fact's rejection of an employer's asserted reasons for its actions does not entitle a
plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law).
233. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149 (2000) (holding
that a plaintiffs prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for
a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its
decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding for intentional discrimination under the
ADEA).
234. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1092.
235. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 133 (noting that the claims were being brought pursuant to
the federal ADEA); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 502 (indicating that the case was brought pursuant
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importantly, neither case suggests the Court's view on whether
McDonnell Douglas is procedural for purposes of vertical choice
of law analysis.
This distinction is important because courts often
characterize similar issues differently depending on whether
they apply vertical choice of law analysis or decline to apply Erie
considerations at all.2 36 As the Third Circuit indicated: "We must
be wary of importing the dichotomy of the substance/procedure
label from one context to another."2 37 The Supreme Court's
indication that the framework is procedural in a federal question
context provides us with little guidance about whether the Court
would reach the same conclusion in a diversity case. As discussed
earlier, given the twin aims of Erie and the substantive reasons
underlying McDonnell Douglas, the better view holds that
McDonnell Douglas belongs on the substantive238 side of vertical
choice of law issues.
In a separate consideration, the Ninth Circuit noted that its
holding was "consistent with circuit law on the application of
federal summary judgment procedures in diversity cases."239
However, the cases cited by the court in support of this
proposition are inapposite to the situation faced by the court.
In Gasaway v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., the
Ninth Circuit considered whether a plaintiffs failure to submit
evidence to counter evidence presented by defendants at
summary judgment should be evaluated under Hawaiian law or
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 ° Because Rule 56(e)
was in direct conflict with the position being advocated by
plaintiff under state law, a Hanna analysis would apply to the
to Title VII).
236. Solum, supra note 211, at 196 (noting that the terms "substance" and
.procedure" take on different meanings in different contexts).
237. Fauber v. KEM Transp. & Equip. Co., 876 F.2d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 1989); see also
Md. Cas. Co. v. Williams, 377 F.2d 389, 394-95 (5th Cir. 1967) (indicating that
presumptions may be procedural for horizontal choice of law questions and substantive
for vertical choice of law questions).
238. Use of the terms "procedural" and "substantive" to describe vertical choice of
law issues that fall under the Gasperini prong is inherently problematic because many of
the rules that fall within this analysis are arguably both procedural and substantive. I
use these terms only because the Ninth Circuit believed that the McDonnell Douglas test
could easily be characterized as procedural. I find it more helpful in the Gasperini context
to consider whether state rules that appear to be procedural rely on substantive concerns,
not to rely on the monikers "substance" and "procedure."
239. Snead, 237 F.3d at 1093.
240. Gasaway v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming a
ruling that an insurer was entitled to rescind an insurance policy on grounds of
misrepresentations in the application).
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Gasaway case,2 4' not the Gasperini analysis that the Ninth
Circuit would use with a judge-made rule, like McDonnell
Douglas. Likewise, although the Ninth Circuit in Caesar Electric
Inc. v. Andrews,242 expressed the broad statement that "under the
Erie doctrine, federal law governs the procedural aspects of
summary judgment in a diversity case,"2 43 it appears that the
panel was also dealing with a conflict with Rule 56. 2" The
question before the court in Snead was much different than the
issues faced in Gasaway and Caesar. In Snead, the plaintiff was
challenging the underlying legal standard that the court used in
determining summary judgment,24 not the procedural aspects of
Rule 56.
Surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit failed to review other
circuits' decisions regarding the interaction of McDonnell
Douglas and its characterization for purposes of vertical choice of
law. Although these cases engage in little substantive discussion
about the two doctrines, many cases hold that where a state
standard conflicts with McDonnell Douglas, the state standard,
not the federal standard, should apply.246 One case goes as far as
referring to McDonnell Douglas as "federal common law."247
5. Why the Procedural Versus Substantive Characterization
for Purposes of Vertical Choice of Law Matters. While it is easy in
hindsight to point out the mistakes in the Ninth Circuit's
analysis, the mistakes themselves are not as important as the
ultimate effect of the holding. As discussed in Part III, the
federal McDonnell Douglas standard is currently in disarray as it
relates to certain types of discrimination claims. Both state and
federal courts differ regarding how these underlying disputes
should be resolved. While the fact that many courts ignore the
241. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965).
242. Caesar Elec. Inc. v. Andrews, 905 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1990).
243. Id. at 289 n.3.
244. Further, it is not clear whether this statement is even part of the holding. The
court indicated that the movant's argument regarding the vertical choice of law issue was
confusing, and that the case cited in support of his proposition was inapposite. Id.
245. Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co, 237 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001)
(introducing the plaintiffs argument that Oregon state law should govern the court's
determination of whether the defendant was entitled to summary judgment).
246. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying New
Mexico's version of McDonnell Douglas); Payne v. Nw. Corp., 185 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting that Montana state antidiscrimination laws did not follow the
McDonnell Douglas standard and that state standard should apply in federal diversity
action); Sandbank v. Kodak Elect. Printing Sys., Inc., 124 F.3d 199 (6th Cir. 1997); see
also Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 303 (3d Cir. 2004) (assuming that
state law would apply to a state age discrimination claim).
247. Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 F. App'x 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2005).
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existence of these differences is problematic, this disregard is less
harmful than the complete stifling of the debate through use of
improper characterization achieved by the Ninth Circuit in the
Snead decision. Those who doubt these effects need to look no
further than subsequent federal district court opinions within the
Ninth Circuit that are bound by Snead.248 Snead essentially
prohibits further development of McDonnell Douglas issues in
federal court under the state discrimination laws of every state
within the circuit.
The use of a procedural characterization in addressing a
vertical choice of law issue to curtail the application of state
standards will have the greatest effect in states that have
explicitly rejected at least parts of the framework for analyzing
state discrimination claims.249 Under the holding in Snead, a
federal court would be free to use a federal version of the
McDonnell Douglas standard, even when a state court has held
that standard inapplicable to the claim. This scenario would
present the starkest example of how improper use of vertical
choice of law characterization directly contradicts notions of
federalism.
To date, very few federal employment cases have raised
vertical choice of law issues related to use of the McDonnell
Douglas standard. There are probably several reasons for this.
First, many practitioners are probably unaware of the vertical
choice of law issues lurking within employment cases. Even those
who are aware of the issues may be wary to enter into disputes
about the Erie doctrine because of unfamiliarity with the complex
issues raised, especially if the issue is characterized as an
unguided Erie choice. 5' Second, in many instances, plaintiffs are
advancing both state and federal claims. Vertical choice of law
248. See Morgan v. New Horizon Commc'ns., No. Civ. CV 03-851-HA, 2005 WL
326966, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2005) (applying Snead); Thomson v. Mentor Graphics
Corp., No. CV-03-1350-ST, 2004 WL 2584022, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2004) (same); Jamal
v. Wilshire Mgmt. Leasing Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1075 (D. Or. 2004) (same).
249. See, e.g., Bourbon v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 474 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (noting that Illinois has specifically rejected application of the McDonnell
Douglas standard to retaliatory discharge cases); McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d
820, 828 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court "has refused to apply
the McDonnell Douglas framework in... cases alleging gender discrimination in the form
of unequal pay; modified the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case in the
context of reverse discrimination failure-to-hire cases; and shifted to employers the
burden of proving the validity of their decisions in some handicap discrimination cases"
(citations omitted)); Ruhlmann v. Ulster County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 234 F. Supp. 2d 140,
178 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (indicating that even though New York applies the McDonnell
Douglas standard, the elements of a prima facie case are different than the elements
articulated by the federal courts).
250. Condlin, supra note 140, at 569-73.
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issues are conceptually difficult, and attorneys may not want to
confuse the court or the jury with the application of different
legal standards in the same case or waste time and resources
arguing over legal issues, rather than the merits of the
underlying case.
Given these practical difficulties, it is easy to understand
why few federal circuit courts have explicitly tackled the issue of
the intersection of McDonnell Douglas and its characterization
for purposes of vertical choice of law. This analytic hole makes it
even more important to understand the errors in the Snead
analysis, so that its faulty application of vertical choice of law is
not relied upon by other courts to further expand the role of the
federal McDonnell Douglas standard in resolving state
discrimination claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Debunking the myth that McDonnell Douglas is a monolithic
standard that should be applied to both federal and state
discrimination claims is especially important given the current
debate about the continued use and expansion of the three-part
burden-shifting framework.
In recent years, the McDonnell Douglas standard has come
under increasing attack from both legal and academic circles.
Some have argued that the benefits of McDonnell Douglas have
been eroded by subsequent case law.2"' Others argue that "[elven
when applied properly, McDonnell Douglas may defeat an
otherwise meritorious civil rights claim."25 Many doubt the
continued viability of the McDonnell Douglas test, given the 1991
amendments to the Civil Rights Act and the Supreme Court's
decision in Desert Palace.253 This Author has questioned whether
the framework was ever supported by the language of Title VII
and suggested that the lack of a proper statutory foundation
lends further credibility to the arguments for McDonnell
Douglas's demise.254
At the same time that the framework is coming under
increasing scrutiny, it also is being expanded to apply to different
employment-related statutes. Although the McDonnell Douglas
251. See Kenneth R. Davis, Pricefixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. L. REV. 859, 862 (2004) (arguing that
McDonnell Douglas framework has largely been superseded).
252. Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 707 (1995).
253. See, e.g., supra note 117.
254. See generally Sperino, supra note 40.
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standard was originally limited to the Title VII context, it quickly
expanded to a test used for analyzing claims under the ADA,255
the ADEA,256 and discrimination cases brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.257 In recent years, courts have expanded the reach
of McDonnell Douglas and applied it to cases brought under the
FMLA and state workers' compensation cases. 58
As the McDonnell Douglas test comes under increasing
scrutiny and its continued usefulness is called into question, the
resolution of substantive issues related to the framework is even
more important. States, through the development of their own
employment discrimination statutes, have important
contributions to make in the development of employment law and
to the ultimate questions of whether McDonnell Douglas should
survive as an analytical framework and in what form.
Unfortunately, by relying too heavily on the federal versions of
the McDonnell Douglas framework, courts are stifling
employment law and denying the field the benefits that our
system of federalism offers.
255. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 (2003).
256. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).
257. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993).
258. Daniels v. R.E. Michel Co., 941 F. Supp. 629, 632 (E.D. Ky. 1996) ("Although the
Court is unable to locate any Kentucky cases which incorporate the McDonnell Douglas
shifting burdens model commonly used in federal employment discrimination and
retaliation cases (and Kentucky civil rights cases under KRS 344) in actions for
retaliation for workers' compensation claims, this model is instructive in assessing the
evidence presented here.").
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